@techreport{a26401762c9448c180180f94ca1f9019,
title = "Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model",
abstract = "We consider the joint decision of placing public bads in each of two neighboring countries, modelled by two adjacent line segments. Residents of the two countries have single-dipped preferences, determined by the location of the nearest public bad to their dips. A social choice function or rule takes a profile of reported preferences as input and assigns the location of the public bad in each country. All rules satisfying strategy-proofness, country-specific Pareto optimality, non-corruptibility, and the far away condition are characterized. These rules pick only boundary locations.",
author = "A. Lahiri and H.J.M. Peters and A.J.A. Storcken",
year = "2015",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.26481/umagsb.2015007",
language = "English",
series = "GSBE Research Memoranda",
publisher = "Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics",
number = "007",
address = "Netherlands",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics",
}