Abstract
We show that if an agent reasons according to standard inference rules, the truth and introspection axioms extend from the set of non-epistemic propositions to the whole set of propositions. This implies that the usual axiomatization of partitional possibility correspondences is redundant, and provides a justification for truth and introspection that is partly based on reasoning.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 513-523 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Theory and Decision |
Volume | 73 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Oct 2012 |
Keywords
- Knowledge
- Introspection
- Truth axiom
- Partitional information structures
- Epistemic game theory
- BAYESIAN PLAYERS
- EQUILIBRIUM
- KNOWLEDGE
- DISAGREE
- GAMES