TY - JOUR
T1 - Q Fever: Single-Point Source Outbreak With High Attack Rates and Massive Numbers of Undetected Infections Across an Entire Region
AU - Hackert, Volker H.
AU - van der Hoek, Wim
AU - Dukers-Muijrers, Nicole H.T.M.
AU - de Bruin, Arnout
AU - Al Dahouk, Sascha
AU - Neubauer, Heinrich
AU - Bruggeman, Cathrien A.
AU - Hoebe, Christian J. P. A.
PY - 2012/12/15
Y1 - 2012/12/15
N2 - Background. In early 2009, a dairy-goat annex care farm in South Limburg, the Netherlands, reported 220 Coxiella burnetii-related abortions in 450 pregnant goats. These preceded human cases and occurred in a region that was Q-fever free before 2009, providing a unique quasi-experimental setting for investigating regional transmission patterns associated with a Q-fever point source. Methods. Index-farm residents/employees, visitors, and their household contacts were traced and screened for C. burnetii. Distribution of community cases was analysed using a geographic information system. True incidence, including undetected infections, was estimated regionwide by seroprevalence in a pre-versus postoutbreak sample, and near-farm by immunoglobulin M seroprevalence in a municipal population sample. Environmental bacterial load was repeatedly measured in surface and aerosol samples. Results. Serological attack rate was 92% (24/26) in index-farm residents/employees, 56% (28/50) in visitors, and 50% (7/14) in household contacts, and the clinical attack rate (ie, the proportion of persons seropositive for acute infection who also had clinical illness) was >= 80%. Notified symptomatic community cases (n = 253) were scattered downwind from the index farm, following a significant exposure-response gradient. Observed incidence ranged from 6.3% (0-1 km) to 0.1% (4-5 km), and remained high beyond. True incidence of infections was estimated at 2.9% regionwide, extrapolating to 8941 infections; estimated near-farm incidence was 12%. Coxiella burnetii load was high on-farm (2009), and lower off-farm (2009-2010). Conclusions. Linking a single dairy-goat farm to a human Q-fever cluster, we show widespread transmission, massive numbers of undetected infections, and high attack rates on-and off-farm, even beyond a 5-km high-risk zone. Our investigation may serve as an essential case study for risk assessment in public health and related fields such as bioterrorism response and preparedness.
AB - Background. In early 2009, a dairy-goat annex care farm in South Limburg, the Netherlands, reported 220 Coxiella burnetii-related abortions in 450 pregnant goats. These preceded human cases and occurred in a region that was Q-fever free before 2009, providing a unique quasi-experimental setting for investigating regional transmission patterns associated with a Q-fever point source. Methods. Index-farm residents/employees, visitors, and their household contacts were traced and screened for C. burnetii. Distribution of community cases was analysed using a geographic information system. True incidence, including undetected infections, was estimated regionwide by seroprevalence in a pre-versus postoutbreak sample, and near-farm by immunoglobulin M seroprevalence in a municipal population sample. Environmental bacterial load was repeatedly measured in surface and aerosol samples. Results. Serological attack rate was 92% (24/26) in index-farm residents/employees, 56% (28/50) in visitors, and 50% (7/14) in household contacts, and the clinical attack rate (ie, the proportion of persons seropositive for acute infection who also had clinical illness) was >= 80%. Notified symptomatic community cases (n = 253) were scattered downwind from the index farm, following a significant exposure-response gradient. Observed incidence ranged from 6.3% (0-1 km) to 0.1% (4-5 km), and remained high beyond. True incidence of infections was estimated at 2.9% regionwide, extrapolating to 8941 infections; estimated near-farm incidence was 12%. Coxiella burnetii load was high on-farm (2009), and lower off-farm (2009-2010). Conclusions. Linking a single dairy-goat farm to a human Q-fever cluster, we show widespread transmission, massive numbers of undetected infections, and high attack rates on-and off-farm, even beyond a 5-km high-risk zone. Our investigation may serve as an essential case study for risk assessment in public health and related fields such as bioterrorism response and preparedness.
U2 - 10.1093/cid/cis734
DO - 10.1093/cid/cis734
M3 - Article
C2 - 22918992
SN - 1058-4838
VL - 55
SP - 1591
EP - 1599
JO - Clinical Infectious Diseases
JF - Clinical Infectious Diseases
IS - 12
ER -