Perfect information stochastic games and related classes

F Thuijsman; TES Raghavan

doi:10.1007/BF01263280

Perfect information stochastic games and related classes

F Thuijsman^*, TES Raghavan

^*Corresponding author for this work

Networks and Strategic Optimization

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

Forn-person perfect information stochastic games and forn-person stochastic games with additive rewards and additive transitions (arat) we show the existence of pure limiting average equilibria. Using a similar approach we also derive the existence of limiting average e-equilibria for two-person switching control stochastic games. The orderfield property holds for each of the classes mentioned, and algorithms to compute equilibria are pointed out.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	403-408
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	26
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01263280
Publication status	Published - 1997

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10.1007/BF01263280

Cite this

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title = "Perfect information stochastic games and related classes",

abstract = "Forn-person perfect information stochastic games and forn-person stochastic games with additive rewards and additive transitions (arat) we show the existence of pure limiting average equilibria. Using a similar approach we also derive the existence of limiting average e-equilibria for two-person switching control stochastic games. The orderfield property holds for each of the classes mentioned, and algorithms to compute equilibria are pointed out.",

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AB - Forn-person perfect information stochastic games and forn-person stochastic games with additive rewards and additive transitions (arat) we show the existence of pure limiting average equilibria. Using a similar approach we also derive the existence of limiting average e-equilibria for two-person switching control stochastic games. The orderfield property holds for each of the classes mentioned, and algorithms to compute equilibria are pointed out.

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M3 - Article

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