Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once

Kutay Cingiz; Janos Flesch; P. Jean-Jacques Herings; Arkadi Predtetchinski

doi:10.26481/umagsb.2016036

Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once

Kutay Cingiz, Janos Flesch, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski

Research output: Working paper / Preprint › Working paper

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Abstract

We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games admit no subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for small positive values of ϵ. Furthermore we derive a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium.

Original language	English
Publisher	Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2016036
Publication status	Published - 2016

Publication series

Series	GSBE Research Memoranda
Number	036

JEL classifications

c72 - Noncooperative Games
c73 - "Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games"
d91 - "Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving"

Access to Document

10.26481/umagsb.2016036

RM16036Final published version, 516 KB

Cite this

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