On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions

H.J.M. Peters; M.J.W. Schröder; A.J. Vermeulen

doi:10.1007/s00355-015-0891-6

On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions

H.J.M. Peters, M.J.W. Schröder^*, A.J. Vermeulen

^*Corresponding author for this work

Quantitative Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We consider effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives. We assume that players have incomplete information—with private values—about the preferences of the other players. Our main result is the characterization of effectivity functions which have an ex post Nash consistent representation, i.e., there is a game form such that (i) the distribution of power among coalitions of players is the same as in the effectivity function and (ii) there is an ex post Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) for any preference profile.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	287-307
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	45
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0891-6
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2015

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Cite this

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AB - We consider effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives. We assume that players have incomplete information—with private values—about the preferences of the other players. Our main result is the characterization of effectivity functions which have an ex post Nash consistent representation, i.e., there is a game form such that (i) the distribution of power among coalitions of players is the same as in the effectivity function and (ii) there is an ex post Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) for any preference profile.

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