@techreport{d6c1cc78dcc8433b87595d33b51d6da8,
title = "Number of bidders and the winner's curse",
abstract = "The second-price sealed-bid common-value auction exhibits lower winner's curse probability compared to the rst-price auction for any number of bidders. For both auction types, above a certain threshold adding more bidders increases the chances of the winner's curse only marginally while it decreases potential losses to the bidders and increases revenue. Below this threshold, having fewer bidders lowers the winner's curse probability and the losses to the bidders, but also the average revenue.",
keywords = "Winner's curse, number of bidders, common value auctions",
author = "Ronald Peeters and Anastas Tenev",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.26481/umagsb.2016031",
language = "English",
series = "GSBE Research Memoranda",
publisher = "Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics",
number = "031",
address = "Netherlands",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics",
}