Number of Bidders and the Winner’s Curse

Ronald Peeters; Anastas P. Tenev

doi:10.1515/bejeap-2018-0025

Number of Bidders and the Winner’s Curse

Ronald Peeters^*, Anastas P. Tenev

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

Within an affiliated value auction setting, we study the relationship between the number of bidders and the winner’s curse in terms of its frequency of occurrence and its expected harm. From a design perspective, we find that both the number of bidders and the level of affiliation are instrumental when choosing an auction format and whether to encourage or discourage bidder participation.

Original language	English
Article number	20180025
Pages (from-to)	1-4
Number of pages	4
Journal	B E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
Volume	18
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2018-0025
Publication status	Published - Jul 2018

JEL classifications

d44 - Auctions
d82 - "Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design"
h57 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement

Keywords

winner's curse
number of bidders
affiliated value auctions
COMMON VALUE AUCTIONS

Access to Document

10.1515/bejeap-2018-0025

Cite this

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