Research output

Multi-Battle n-Player Dynamic Contests

Research output: ProfessionalWorking paper

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Abstract

In presidential primaries, proportional campaign resource allocation to states with respect to their delegate numbers is a desirable concept. To study proportionality, we introduce a novel model for n-player multi-battle dynamic contests. We show that when players maximize their expected number of delegates there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which players allocate their resources proportionally. However for at least 4 number of states and at least 2 delegates, when players maximize their probability of winning, there is always a distribution of delegates over the states such that population proportionality is not satisfied.

    Research areas

  • Presidential elections, dynamic contests, presedential primaries, population proportionality, multi-battle contests

Documents

  • RM18003

    Final published version, 562 KB, PDF-document

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Details

Original languageEnglish
PublisherGSBE
StatePublished - 8 Feb 2018

Publication series

NameGSBE Research Memoranda
PublisherGSBE
No.003