TY - JOUR
T1 - Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining Under Uncertainty
AU - Peters, H.J.M.
AU - Bossert, W.
PY - 2001/1/1
Y1 - 2001/1/1
N2 - Bargaining under uncertainty is modeled by the assumption that there are several possible states of nature, each of which is identified with a bargaining problem. We characterize bargaining solutions which generate ex ante efficient combinations of outcomes under the assumption that the bargainers have minimax regret preferences. For the case of two bargainers a class of monotone utopia-path solutions is characterized by the efficiency criterion, but for more than two bargainers only dictatorial solutions are efficient. By incorporating scale covariance into the minimax regret preferences a possibility result is obtained for the general case. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D81, D71.
AB - Bargaining under uncertainty is modeled by the assumption that there are several possible states of nature, each of which is identified with a bargaining problem. We characterize bargaining solutions which generate ex ante efficient combinations of outcomes under the assumption that the bargainers have minimax regret preferences. For the case of two bargainers a class of monotone utopia-path solutions is characterized by the efficiency criterion, but for more than two bargainers only dictatorial solutions are efficient. By incorporating scale covariance into the minimax regret preferences a possibility result is obtained for the general case. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D81, D71.
U2 - 10.1006/game.2000.0793
DO - 10.1006/game.2000.0793
M3 - Article
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 34
SP - 1
EP - 10
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
ER -