Abstract
In a collaborative setting, banks have an additional way to deal with asymmetric
information between themselves and their borrowers: by pooling information.
We explore the extent to which lead arrangers in the project finance syndicated
lending market strategically choose their new partners in order to pool information,
thereby lowering the overall degree of asymmetric information between
themselves and their borrowers. We find that information pooling explains with
whom banks collaborate, why they reach further into their network to find new
partners and why they go outside their existing network if the need to pool information is high enough.
information between themselves and their borrowers: by pooling information.
We explore the extent to which lead arrangers in the project finance syndicated
lending market strategically choose their new partners in order to pool information,
thereby lowering the overall degree of asymmetric information between
themselves and their borrowers. We find that information pooling explains with
whom banks collaborate, why they reach further into their network to find new
partners and why they go outside their existing network if the need to pool information is high enough.
Original language | English |
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Publisher | Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 5 Apr 2018 |
Publication series
Series | GSBE Research Memoranda |
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Number | 008 |
Keywords
- financial economics and financial management