Research output

Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect ϵ-equilibria in games with almost perfect information

Research output: Working paperProfessional

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We study games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. In such games, at each stage, the players simultaneously choose actions from finite action sets, knowing the actions chosen at all previous stages. The payoff of each player is a function of all actions chosen during the game. We define and examine the new condition of individual upper semicontinuity on the payoff functions, which is weaker than upper semicontinuity. We prove that a game with individual upper semicontinuous payoff functions admits a subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for every ϵ > 0, in eventually pure strategy profiles.

    Research areas

  • almost perfect information, subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium, individual upper semicontinuity


  • RM19002

    Final published version, 744 KB, PDF-document

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Original languageEnglish
Number of pages27
Publication statusPublished - 14 Jan 2019

Publication series

NameGSBE Research Memoranda