Gambling in contests with heterogeneous loss constraints

C. Seel*

*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

I study the impact of asymmetric loss constraints on risk-taking behavior in the contest model of Seel and Strack (2013). I derive the unique Nash equilibrium outcome, the equilibrium payoffs and comparative statics about the bankruptcy risk.

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Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)154-157
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume136
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2015

Keywords

  • Contest
  • Risk-taking
  • Credit line
  • ASYMMETRIC CONTESTS
  • HEAD STARTS
  • INFORMATION

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