Evolutionary Games and Local Dynamics

Philippe Uyttendaele; Frank Thuijsman

doi:10.1142/S0219198915400162

Evolutionary Games and Local Dynamics

Philippe Uyttendaele^*, Frank Thuijsman

^*Corresponding author for this work

Networks and Strategic Optimization

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

In this paper, we examine several options for modeling local interactions within the framework of evolutionary game theory. Several examples show that there is a major difference between population dynamics using local dynamics versus global dynamics. Moreover, different modeling choices may lead to very diverse results.

Original language	English
Journal	International Game Theory Review
Volume	17
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198915400162
Publication status	Published - Jun 2015

Keywords

Evolutionary games
replicator dynamics
local interactions

Access to Document

10.1142/S0219198915400162

Cite this

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title = "Evolutionary Games and Local Dynamics",

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