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Euro adoption in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland: Laggards by default and laggards by choice

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Euro adoption in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland : Laggards by default and laggards by choice. / Dandashly, Assem; Verdun, Amy.

In: Comparative European Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3, 20.05.2018, p. 385-412.

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@article{fcd945f3495443f695308adcb2f5986e,
title = "Euro adoption in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland: Laggards by default and laggards by choice",
abstract = "How can we explain the politics of euro adoption in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland? How did the euro crisis influence their positions regarding euro adoption? This article builds on the domestic politics literature and argues: (i) countries that had joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism-2 early had an easier time adopting the euro compared with those that did not; (ii) having a pro-euro government is a necessary but not sufficient condition to adopt the euro; (iii) the political ideology of the ruling elites is important; (iv) the existence of veto points in the domestic political system influences the entire process; (v) although the three countries have made central banks technically independent, the appointment process remains highly political and complex, which has led to conflicts between the central banks and the governments – negatively influencing euro adoption policies; and (vi) the issue does not have much salience in public opinion and thus does not usually feature high on the agenda of the political elites in the three countries. These three countries to date have not adopted the euro for various domestic political reasons. They have at different times been laggards by default or laggards by choice.",
keywords = "BANK, COMMITMENTS, Central Europe, EASTERN-EUROPE, IMPACT, INTEGRATION, INTERESTS, MONETARY INSTITUTIONS, POLICY, POLITICS, UNION, domestic politics, economic and monetary union, euro adoption, new member states, political elites",
author = "Assem Dandashly and Amy Verdun",
year = "2018",
month = "5",
day = "20",
doi = "10.1057/cep.2015.46",
language = "English",
volume = "16",
pages = "385--412",
journal = "Comparative European Politics",
issn = "1472-4790",
publisher = "Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Euro adoption in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland

T2 - Comparative European Politics

AU - Dandashly, Assem

AU - Verdun, Amy

PY - 2018/5/20

Y1 - 2018/5/20

N2 - How can we explain the politics of euro adoption in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland? How did the euro crisis influence their positions regarding euro adoption? This article builds on the domestic politics literature and argues: (i) countries that had joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism-2 early had an easier time adopting the euro compared with those that did not; (ii) having a pro-euro government is a necessary but not sufficient condition to adopt the euro; (iii) the political ideology of the ruling elites is important; (iv) the existence of veto points in the domestic political system influences the entire process; (v) although the three countries have made central banks technically independent, the appointment process remains highly political and complex, which has led to conflicts between the central banks and the governments – negatively influencing euro adoption policies; and (vi) the issue does not have much salience in public opinion and thus does not usually feature high on the agenda of the political elites in the three countries. These three countries to date have not adopted the euro for various domestic political reasons. They have at different times been laggards by default or laggards by choice.

AB - How can we explain the politics of euro adoption in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland? How did the euro crisis influence their positions regarding euro adoption? This article builds on the domestic politics literature and argues: (i) countries that had joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism-2 early had an easier time adopting the euro compared with those that did not; (ii) having a pro-euro government is a necessary but not sufficient condition to adopt the euro; (iii) the political ideology of the ruling elites is important; (iv) the existence of veto points in the domestic political system influences the entire process; (v) although the three countries have made central banks technically independent, the appointment process remains highly political and complex, which has led to conflicts between the central banks and the governments – negatively influencing euro adoption policies; and (vi) the issue does not have much salience in public opinion and thus does not usually feature high on the agenda of the political elites in the three countries. These three countries to date have not adopted the euro for various domestic political reasons. They have at different times been laggards by default or laggards by choice.

KW - BANK

KW - COMMITMENTS

KW - Central Europe

KW - EASTERN-EUROPE

KW - IMPACT

KW - INTEGRATION

KW - INTERESTS

KW - MONETARY INSTITUTIONS

KW - POLICY

KW - POLITICS

KW - UNION

KW - domestic politics

KW - economic and monetary union

KW - euro adoption

KW - new member states

KW - political elites

U2 - 10.1057/cep.2015.46

DO - 10.1057/cep.2015.46

M3 - Article

VL - 16

SP - 385

EP - 412

JO - Comparative European Politics

JF - Comparative European Politics

SN - 1472-4790

IS - 3

ER -