Effectivity and Power

Dominik Karos*, Hans Peters

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

195 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We axiomatically develop a class of power indices for effectivity functions, both for the case where the set of alternatives is finite and where it is infinite. Such power indices make it possible to take the issues under consideration into account, in contrast to power indices defined just for simple games. As an example, we consider the US legislative system. We also show that our approach can be used to develop power indices for spatial political games. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)363-378
Number of pages16
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume108
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2018

JEL classifications

  • c71 - Cooperative Games

Keywords

  • effectivity funtion
  • Power index
  • Effectivity function

Cite this