Correlated-belief equilibrium

Elias Tsakas

doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0791-4

Correlated-belief equilibrium

Elias Tsakas^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

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Abstract

We introduce a new solution concept, called correlated-belief equilibrium. The difference to nash equilibrium is that, while each player has correct marginal conjectures about each opponent, it is not necessarily the case that these marginal conjectures are independent. Then, we provide an epistemic foundation and we relate correlated-belief equilibrium with standard solution concepts, such as rationalizability, correlated equilibrium and conjectural equilibrium.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	757-779
Journal	Synthese
Volume	193
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0791-4
Publication status	Published - Mar 2016

Keywords

Correlated beliefs
Product measures
Nash equilibrium
Conjectural equilibrium
I-consistency

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Cite this

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KW - Product measures

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - Conjectural equilibrium

KW - I-consistency

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