Competition versus collusion: The impact of consumer inertia

Iwan Bos, Ronald Peeters*, Erik Pot

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Amodel of dynamic price competition is analyzed to assess howconsumer inertia may impact the ability of firms to sustain high prices. Three main consequences are identified: maintaining high prices does not require punishment strategies when firms are sufficientlymyopic; for sufficiently high levels of inertia, high prices can be sustained at all discount factors; and the ability to maintain high prices may depend non-monotonically on the level of the discount factor. Our findings offer implications for strategic firm behavior and public policy. For example, measures aiming to reduce the degree of consumer inertia are unambiguously effective in traditional markets, but may facilitate collusion in network industries.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)387-400
Number of pages14
JournalInternational Journal of Economic Theory
Volume13
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2017

Keywords

  • collusion
  • consumer inertia
  • dynamic competition
  • SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS
  • SWITCHING COSTS
  • DYNAMIC COMPETITION
  • MEETINGS
  • DUOPOLY
  • MARKET

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