Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis

Giacomo Bonanno; Elias Tsakas

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.003

Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis

Giacomo Bonanno^*, Elias Tsakas

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We study common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative model of beliefs. We characterize two standard solution concepts for such games: the Iterated Deletion of Borgers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and the Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP). We do so by imposing nested restrictions on the doxastic models: namely, the respective epistemic conditions differ in the fact that IDIP requires the truth axiom whereas IDBS does not. Hence, IDIP refines IDBS. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	231-241
Number of pages	11
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	112
Issue number	November 2018
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.003
Publication status	Published - Nov 2018

Keywords

Ordinal payoffs
Rationality
Common belief
Dominance
Iterated deletion procedure
RATIONALIZABILITY
PROBABILITY
LOGIC

Access to Document

10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.003

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825618301441?via%3Dihub

Cite this

@article{b530a44b734447509601895573334594,

title = "Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis",

abstract = "We study common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative model of beliefs. We characterize two standard solution concepts for such games: the Iterated Deletion of Borgers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and the Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP). We do so by imposing nested restrictions on the doxastic models: namely, the respective epistemic conditions differ in the fact that IDIP requires the truth axiom whereas IDBS does not. Hence, IDIP refines IDBS. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.",

keywords = "Ordinal payoffs, Rationality, Common belief, Dominance, Iterated deletion procedure, RATIONALIZABILITY, PROBABILITY, LOGIC",

author = "Giacomo Bonanno and Elias Tsakas",

note = "Data source: no data used. ",

year = "2018",

month = nov,

doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.003",

language = "English",

volume = "112",

pages = "231--241",

journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",

issn = "0899-8256",

publisher = "Elsevier",

number = "November 2018",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis

AU - Bonanno, Giacomo

AU - Tsakas, Elias

N1 - Data source: no data used.

PY - 2018/11

Y1 - 2018/11

N2 - We study common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative model of beliefs. We characterize two standard solution concepts for such games: the Iterated Deletion of Borgers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and the Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP). We do so by imposing nested restrictions on the doxastic models: namely, the respective epistemic conditions differ in the fact that IDIP requires the truth axiom whereas IDBS does not. Hence, IDIP refines IDBS. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

AB - We study common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative model of beliefs. We characterize two standard solution concepts for such games: the Iterated Deletion of Borgers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and the Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP). We do so by imposing nested restrictions on the doxastic models: namely, the respective epistemic conditions differ in the fact that IDIP requires the truth axiom whereas IDBS does not. Hence, IDIP refines IDBS. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

KW - Ordinal payoffs

KW - Rationality

KW - Common belief

KW - Dominance

KW - Iterated deletion procedure

KW - RATIONALIZABILITY

KW - PROBABILITY

KW - LOGIC

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.003

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.003

M3 - Article

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 112

SP - 231

EP - 241

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - November 2018

ER -