Abstract
We show that feasible elimination procedures (peleg, 1978) can be used to select k from m alternatives. An important advantage of this method is the core property: no coalition can guarantee an outcome that is preferred by all its members. We also show that the problem of determining whether a specific k-tuple can result from a feasible elimination procedure is computationally equivalent to the problem of finding a maximal matching in a bipartite graph.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 254-261 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 103 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - May 2017 |
JEL classifications
- c70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
- d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"
Keywords
- Feasible elimination procedure
- Choosing k from m
- Axiomatization
- Computation