Research output

Bertrand Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Solution in Pure Strategies

Research output: ProfessionalWorking paper

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Abstract

We consider two versions of a Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric costs and homogeneous goods. They differ in whether predatory pricing is allowed. For each version, we derive the Myopic Stable Set in pure strategies as introduced by Demuynck, Herings, Saulle, and Seel (2017). We contrast our prediction to the prediction of Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies.

    Research areas

  • Bertrand Competition, Asymmetric Costs, Myopic Stable Set

Documents

  • RM18002

    Final published version, 481 KB, PDF-document

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Details

Original languageEnglish
PublisherGSBE
StatePublished - 8 Feb 2018

Publication series

NameGSBE Research Memoranda
PublisherGSBE
No.002