Believing does not equal remembering: The effects of social feedback and objective false evidence on belief in occurrence, belief in accuracy, and recollection

Henry Otgaar*, Jianqin Wang, Jan-Philipp Fränken, Mark L Howe

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We examined the impact of social feedback and objective false evidence on belief in occurrence, belief in accuracy, and recollection of an autobiographical experience. Participants viewed six virtual scenes (e.g., park) and were tested on their belief/recollection. After 1-week, participants were randomly assigned to four groups. One group received social feedback that one scene was not experienced. A second group received objective false evidence that one of the scenes was not shown. A third group received both social feedback and objective false evidence and the control group did not receive any manipulation. Belief in occurrence dropped considerably in the social feedback group and in the combined group. Also, nonbelieved memories were most likely to occur in participants receiving both social feedback and objective false evidence. We show that social feedback and objective false evidence undermine belief in occurrence, but that they leave belief in accuracy and recollection unaffected.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)271-280
Number of pages10
JournalActa Psychologica
Volume191
Early online date22 Oct 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2018

Keywords

  • APPRAISALS
  • Autobiographical memory
  • Belief
  • MEMORIES
  • Nonbelieved memory
  • PHOTOGRAPHS
  • Recollection

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