Abstract
In the roman catholic church, the pope is elected by the (cardinal) electors through “scrutiny,” where each elector casts an anonymous nomination. Using historical documents, we argue that a guiding principle for the church has been the protection of electors from the temptation to defy god through dishonest nomination. Based on axiomatic analysis involving this principle, we recommend that the church overturn the changes of pope pius xii to reinstate the scrutiny of pope gregory xv, and argue that randomization in the case of deadlock merits consideration.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 713-743 |
Number of pages | 31 |
Journal | Economic Theory |
Volume | 69 |
Issue number | 3 |
Early online date | 27 Feb 2019 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Apr 2020 |
JEL classifications
- z12 - Cultural Economics: Religion
- d82 - "Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design"
- d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"
Keywords
- Conclave
- Impartiality
- Mechanism design
- Pope
- CHOICE
- GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
- BANKRUPTCY
- RULES