A generalization of the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions

Dominik Karos; Nozomu Muto; Shiran Rachmilevitch

doi:10.1007/s00182-018-0611-4

A generalization of the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions

Dominik Karos^*, Nozomu Muto, Shiran Rachmilevitch

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We characterize the class of weakly efficient n-person bargaining solutions that solely depend on the ratios of the players' ideal payoffs. In the case of at least three players the ratio between the solution payoffs of any two players is a power of the ratio between their ideal payoffs. As special cases this class contains the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions, which can be pinned down by imposing additional axioms.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1169-1182
Number of pages	14
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	47
Issue number	4
Early online date	22 Jan 2018
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0611-4
Publication status	Published - Nov 2018

JEL classifications

c71 - Cooperative Games
c78 - "Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory"

Keywords

Bargaining
Efficiency-free characterizations
Parametrized solutions
C78
C71
NASH

Access to Document

10.1007/s00182-018-0611-4Licence: CC BY

Cite this

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