A fair solution to the compensation problem

G. Valletta

doi:10.1007/s00355-008-0335-7

A fair solution to the compensation problem

G. Valletta^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We deal with a fair division model concerning compensation among individuals endowed with different, non transferable, personal talents. We construct social orderings over all conceivable allocations based on efficiency, fairness, and robustness properties. Relying on orderings gives us the possibility of deriving the appropriate public policy even if incentive constraints arise.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	455-478
Number of pages	23
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	32
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0335-7
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2009

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10.1007/s00355-008-0335-7

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