

Bayesian persuasion

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Propositions

Accompanying the PhD dissertation entitled

“Bayesian Persuasion: Elections and Informativeness of Beliefs”

By Toygar T. Kerman

1. A sender who is communicating with voters benefits from private communication (Chapter 2).
2. Implementing sincere voting in equilibrium under private communication is costly, but still an improvement upon public communication (Chapter 2).
3. There are communication networks in which a sender’s ability to manipulate the voters is not hindered (Chapter 3).
4. Access to more information might make voters worse off (Chapter 3).
5. Pinning down feasible distributions of beliefs under private communication requires more than Bayes plausibility (Chapter 4).
6. There is a limit to the polarisation one can create in society (Chapter 4).
7. The dissertation complements the extensive literature on Bayesian persuasion under collective decision-making.
8. Specifying allocation of information is important!
9. The effectivity of real-world institutions may be improved by information design.
10. Ignorance is sometimes bliss.