

On stability in matching and strategy-proofness in social choice

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STELLINGEN

ACCOMPANYING THE THESIS

ON STABILITY IN MATCHING AND STRATEGY-PROOFNESS IN SOCIAL CHOICE

BY

SHASHWAT KHARE

1. Couples want to stay together. Thus, it is natural to assume that the members of a couple would be willing to violate responsiveness to be matched together.
(Chapter 2)
2. Altruism ensures stability.
(Chapter 3)
3. Even though responsive couples' preferences give a unique set of individual preferences for the members of the couple, responsiveness in itself need not be enough for stability.
(Chapter 3)
4. Different people can have different partial information leading to different domains of preferences.
(Chapter 4)
5. A non-dictatorial social choice rule need not always be non-image dictatorial.
(Chapter 4)
6. The main question of Matching Theory is: Given different groups of agents or objects, how can we find mutually beneficial relationships between the members of different groups.
7. Social Choice Theory is not just a theory, but a cluster of models which helps in combining individual preferences to provide a collective output.
8. Often, the most straightforward method to prove a theorem is the correct way of proving it.
9. In real life applications of the results of the chapters, it is important for the planner to check whether all the conditions imposed are fully met.