

# On the political economy of resource rents distribution

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# **Propositions accompanying the thesis**

## **On the Political Economy of Resource Rents Distribution**

Insights from a Developing and Decentralized Country

By Maria Antonieta Collazos - Ortiz

1. The regulatory framework governing intergovernmental transfers plays a significant role in mitigating the impact of political party alignment on inefficient resource distribution to subnational governments. (Chapter 2)
2. An intentional and strategic structuring of policy design creates conditions that can potentially favor politically aligned subnational governments, granting them greater access to resources. (Chapter 2)
3. The influence of resource rents on Political Budget Cycles (PBCs) undermines the efficiency goals associated with fiscal decentralization and underscores the necessity of safeguarding human capital investments against resource volatility. (Chapter 3)

4. The complex interplay among natural resource rents, PBCs, investment decisions, and the promotion of human capital highlights the intricate dynamics involved in the effective management of resource revenues. (Chapter 3)
5. Subnational administrative efficiency enhances revenue generation capacity and responsiveness to royalty revenue changes, highlighting institutional quality's role in curbing the substitution between tax and royalty revenue in the resource curse context. (Chapter 4)
6. Tailoring policies for intergovernmental fiscal transfers to address administrative efficiency disparities among local governments, particularly in developing countries, is essential to strengthen subnational fiscal resilience. (Chapter 4)
7. Ongoing institutional changes in revenue distribution significantly impact the efficient distribution of resources and the subsequent fiscal responses of utility-maximizing political agents within government structures.
8. Policy design significantly shapes the impact and effectiveness of fiscal federalism on compromising or not, the desired outcomes, societal performance and overall development.

9. Understanding political agents' influence on policy design and the diverse responses at different government levels to ongoing institutional changes is essential for assessing fiscal federalism interventions and for addressing outcome discrepancies
10. Crafting institutions that minimize political influence and guarantee subnational autonomy is imperative for efficient resource distribution and management, and ultimately attaining desired national outcomes