

# Asymmetric information, partially defined games, minimal manipulability

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## Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift

Asymmetric Information,  
Partially Defined Games,  
Minimal Manipulability

van

Stefan Maus

1. Similar agents need not be treated equally anymore in the grand coalition if there is information asymmetry. (Example 21)
2. If insider trading is not possible and agents have the information contained in their initial endowments, decentralisation by prices is possible for all agents with positive wealth from initial endowments. (Theorem 26)
3. The second best solution in terms of manipulability is not much better than dictatorship if one wants unanimity of the voting procedure. (Theorem 50)
4. Status-quo voting is at least for three alternatives a least manipulable form of voting if one wants anonymity and unanimity (or Pareto optimality) of the voting procedure. (Theorem 73 & Lemma 76)
5. Sampling from the space of 0-1 normalized convex games with  $n$  players is not easy, even if  $n=3$ .
6. The Fishburn-rules behave nicely in terms of manipulability if one wants anonymity, Pareto-optimality and quasi-neutrality (neutrality as far as possible) of the voting procedure.
7. The use of a computer in social choice can create new conjectures within seconds.
8. The time it takes to prove conjectures obtained under 6. is about 8 months. It may take already a month to understand what the computer wants to say.
9. Though board-gamers follow game theory without knowing a piece of it, knowing game theory does not help in board-game championships.