

Beyond the inside-outside divide

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Beyond the inside–outside divide: fuzzy-set measurement of configurations of strategies in NGO campaigns

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Abstract

One of the main focal points of studies on interest groups and lobbying has been the different strategies that groups use. Despite the fact that political actions can target both the state and the market, these have not been examined together within either the literature on lobbying or social movements. Moreover, while it is now accepted that groups use combinations of inside and outside strategies, these combinations have been difficult to measure in practice. This paper develops a method for measuring configurations of strategies using principles of qualitative comparative analysis and demonstrates the method's application to 24 NGO campaigns in Italy and the UK across four issue areas: cage eggs, ocean plastics, antibiotics in farming and digital civil rights. I find that inside and outside strategies are used differently in the state and the market, and that market strategies can be used either to supplement lobbying on public policy or to directly target companies. These findings imply that it is worthwhile including market strategies in studies, as they improve our understanding of the ways in which NGOs address different audiences while lobbying.

Keywords Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) · Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) · Advocacy campaigns · Boycotts

Introduction

All politically active non-governmental organisations (NGOs) make choices when deciding how and where to campaign. They can contact policymakers directly, mobilise their constituents or the public or target companies with viral videos or social media strategies. In reality, groups choose how they *combine* different methods and targets to influence policy and regulate corporate behaviour through issue-based campaigns.

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Despite the prevalence of mixed advocacy today, scholars of NGOs and lobbying have been slow to include the market in their frameworks of advocacy strategies: while analysing both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ strategies, this literature focuses only on lobbying towards public institutions (Beyers 2004). When company-oriented strategies such as boycotts have been included, these have been added to the ‘outside’ strategies category without distinguishing between the different targets (Kriesi et al. 2007). In contrast, social movement scholars have examined advocacy in the market, but they tend to focus on ‘contentious politics’ and disregard other, more institutionalised, forms of action or cooperation and collaboration with firms (Wahlström and Peterson 2006; Soule 2009). They also often examine *only* market strategies, without combining insights into political action in both the state and the market (den Hond and de Bakker 2007). The two fields have thus remained remarkably separate, and the comparative study of both market and state strategies by NGOs has been neglected.

As a result, we know very little about *how* and *why* NGOs use such strategies, particularly in combination with other tactics in their advocacy on specific issues. Previous work has begun to reconcile different strands of literature to provide a way of structuring studies of NGO lobbying in the state and the market (Colli and Adriaensen 2018), and this paper builds upon this, bridging these state- and market-based perspectives in measuring group strategies. Using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), it develops a method for measuring configurations of strategies that can be used in future qualitative and quantitative studies and then applies this method to data on campaigns on four issues and two countries to describe the configurations of strategies used by NGOs. I find that inside and outside strategies are used differently in the state and the market, and that market strategies can be used either to supplement lobbying on public policy or to directly target companies.

Examining how NGOs combine actions towards companies and the state is important to gain a broader picture of how they (attempt to) gain influence over public policy and company actions. This has important implications for how we understand the representation of citizens in democracy. If NGOs turn to the market because they are excluded from public policymaking or because they feel that they are insufficiently listened to by policymakers, this may reflect underlying bias in the political system and reflects negatively on the state of citizen representation in democracy. Examining the combinations of strategies that groups use points to the reasons why they use them, and what this means for how CSOs are included or excluded from policymaking.

In addition to social relevance, this paper has three main points of added academic value. First and foremost, it explicitly investigates both state and market strategies by NGOs and compares their use side-by-side, as yet unstudied in the academic literature. Second, this paper focuses on *configurations*. There is a growing acknowledgement that while groups may ‘specialise’ in one sort of strategy, they tend to use a mix of strategies to achieve political influence (Binderkrantz 2008; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2017). However, the majority of studies on lobbying and campaigning have been unable to measure true configurations; using QCA—in addition to this paper’s focus on issue campaigns as a unit of analysis, discussed below—helps to overcome this limitation. These configurations can tell us whether groups are really working outside of the political system, and why they



use market strategies and state strategies together. Third, the use of fuzzy sets—which allow for degrees of membership along a continuum—means that these campaigns can be studied by *type* rather than purely by degree. In other words, the method used in this paper allows a qualitative grouping of NGO campaigns by the types of strategies they use, while retaining meaningful qualitative difference through the use of fuzzy-set membership scores. This leads to a nuanced measure and grouping of how organisations combine strategies during their campaigns on one issue.

This paper begins with an outline of the current state of the research on NGOs, their different objectives and what is meant by an ‘issue campaign’, before turning to the strategies that they use in the market and the state and combinations thereof. It then explains the method used here to construct a measure of these configurations, using principles from set theory and fuzzy-set QCA, and presents the measures themselves. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of the findings for our understanding of strategies and how NGOs address different audiences with their advocacy.

NGOs, campaigns and strategies

NGO objectives and campaigns

NGOs have been included under the label of ‘diffuse’ or ‘public interest’ groups since the early days of interest group studies. Research into NGO political activity in the USA has found that the importance of advocacy to organisations varies widely (Child and Gronberg 2007) and that most NGOs have a very broad definition of what ‘advocacy’ entails, including participation by members, advocacy towards political actors, companies and cultural organisations (Boris and Steuerle 1998; Berry and Arons 2003). As this implies, NGOs are a diverse category of organisations and have varying objectives, even among those who do lobby. While some NGOs aim to change practices in industries or firms, others aim mostly for public policy change.¹ Groups’ strategies may or may not overlap with these goals: they may lobby for public regulation to affect firms’ behaviour, or may use advocacy towards companies as a means of supplementing their state-based lobbying, either to increase public mobilisation or to push firms to also lobby the state (Colli and Adriaensen 2018).

Of course, NGOs very rarely use one type of strategy. No matter what their objectives are, most NGOs lobby through single-issue campaigns, the unit of analysis at the centre of this research (henceforth ‘issue campaigns’). I define these as sustained action on a single issue by an NGO over the short to medium term (see also ‘data collection’). This is broader than the focus of much interest group studies, which tend to sample on the basis of one bill or policy proposal, and is more in line with the focus of studies of social movements, which examine the action of social movement organisations over time—not necessarily on one policy proposal or dossier. By

¹ Of course, this can also vary from campaign to campaign within one NGO.



focusing on issue campaigns, I highlight the combinations of strategies that NGOs use on one topic. Since most previous research has examined groups' (combinations of) strategies on either one policy or across the group's actions as a whole, the following section is based on this literature, but also highlights the different ways that combinations can be conceptualised.

Advocacy in the state

In the EU, a strong focus of interest group studies—including that on NGOs—has been on the strategies that organisations use when they lobby public institutions. These are divided into two main types: 'inside' strategies that directly contact policymaking institutions (elected representatives or civil servants) and 'outside' strategies, using public opinion or going through the public to influence policymakers (Kollman 1998; Beyers 2004). Examples of the former include responding to consultations, meeting policymakers or attending events with them; the latter includes organising petitions, protests or getting members to write to or call their representatives. These have been labelled two 'logics' of influence (Berkhout 2013; Junk 2016), given that they use different routes and different sources of legitimacy (expertise and public backing) to convince policymakers.²

Empirical findings of the strategies that groups use have been consistently different among business, industry groups and NGOs (Gais and Walker 1991; Binderkrantz 2005), with NGOs more likely to use outside strategies. Moreover, rather than the gap between firms and NGOs narrowing as groups gain resources, it widens: firms with more resources are more likely to use inside strategies, while NGOs with more resources are more likely to use outside ones (Dür and Mateo 2016). This difference is partly due to membership and survival-related goals: NGOs are generally more reliant on 'diffuse' members who are less well-informed about policies due to collective action problems (Olson 1965), and thus rely on being able to 'prove' to their members that they are active (Binderkrantz 2008). NGOs also gain certain benefits from dragging issues into 'noisy' politics, where they can signal public opposition or favour to an issue (Culpepper 2011) and can provide legitimacy for policies in a way that business groups cannot (Trumbull 2012).

Combinations of strategies

Despite this, however, it would be erroneous to claim that NGOs only use outside strategies. As highlighted above, NGOs are not a homogenous group: they control different human, political, financial and intellectual resources and thus gain leverage through a variety of strategies and towards different targets. While groups may specialise in a particular type of strategy or even a particular level of government to target, the majority use combinations of inside and outside strategies when lobbying

² While media-oriented strategies are usually included in outside strategies, these are excluded from the current study. The reasons for this are outlined on pp. 11–12.



for political change (Binderkrantz 2005; Dür and Mateo 2013; Buffardi et al. 2015; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2017). Previous research has shown that outside strategies can be important for gaining access to policymakers because of their resource intensity and are also used by groups other than NGOs to get public attention (Chalmers 2012). This contrasts with earlier work, based on the idea of insider and outsider groups (Maloney et al. 1994; Page 1999), which assumed that adversarial outside tactics precluded inside ones. Inside and outside strategies should thus be seen as ‘complementary rather than competing’, with the choice of strategies not binary but ‘one of combining tactics so as to maximise the chances of success, given limited resources’ (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2017, p. 708).

Combinations of strategies can be conceived of in three different ways, although these are not generally specifically distinguished. First, a group may use different tactics in general, or across all issues on which the group is active. Second, groups can combine tactics sequentially, on the same issue but at a different stage of the policy process. Third, groups can actively and simultaneously combine strategies by, for instance, using outside lobbying at the same time as writing a report to focus policymakers’ attention on the issue. This paper focuses on a combination of the second and third definitions, looking at the ways in which NGOs combine strategies within their campaigns on one issue (either simultaneously or sequentially).

The first definition, however, has actually proved easiest to use in the majority of interest group studies, particularly because of the design of many surveys that inquire about groups’ actions in general rather than on one policy issue. For instance, Kriesi et al. (2007) examine the use of informational and protest strategies by different organisations at the national and EU levels. After surveying groups’ repertoires, the authors constructed indicators for how much an actor exploits the full range of each strategy, both in scope (the number of individual tactics used) and intensity (occasional vs. regular use). The combinations of these strategies were then examined by transforming each strategy into an indicator for the relative importance of that strategy for the group’s action overall. However, the subsequent analysis measures combinations under the third definition—as a proportion of the groups’ total action—rather than looking at the combinations on one particular issue.

Under the second definition, scholars have theorised that there is a temporal aspect to combinations of strategies, with groups using different approaches at different stages of the policy process, depending on public opinion and expertise at each stage (Kollman 1998; Beyers 2004; Binderkrantz 2005). However, work explicitly analysing combinations of strategies on one policy issue is rare: one example is Binderkrantz and Krøyer’s (2012) work, which examines the frequency with which groups combine parliamentary-, media- and public-oriented strategies on one topic. They find that groups with more divisible policy goals were more likely to combine all types of strategies. The third definition—simultaneously combining lobbying strategies—has mostly been used in case studies, as it is obviously difficult to capture this using survey research (Dür and De Bièvre 2007; Kurzer and Cooper 2013). However, most of these do not specifically investigate combinations of strategies.

Two main obstacles exist which make it difficult to study combinations of strategies on a single issue or simultaneously (definitions 2 and 3). First, as mentioned above, many surveys have asked groups about their actions *in general* rather than on



one policy issue or in one campaign, with the result that research is based on data on all actions. Some recent surveys, however, have combined population- and issue-level sampling, which can help to overcome this barrier (Beyers et al. 2014; Dür and Mateo 2016). Nonetheless, these still fall short at the second obstacle: difficulties in operationalising combinations of strategies using proportional methods. Where combinations of strategies are calculated, they are usually operationalised as a simple proportion of all strategies used. However, as mentioned above, in these studies the analysis generally focuses on this proportional measure of individual strategies, rather than on the combinations themselves. Using set theoretic methods can help to differentiate both degree and type of configuration; this is further outlined below.

Bringing the market in

Thus far, the research examined has focused on NGO actions targeting state actors: legislators and the executive. However, the full picture of NGO activity is only visible when market actors are also considered. While non-profit scholars have long referred to the fact that NGOs target their advocacy at corporations (Boris and Steuerle 1998), these market-based actions usually remain unexamined alongside state-based strategies.

Market strategies can be classified from within existing literature as ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, in parallel to the distinction made within the state, to distinguish between direct targeting of firms and signalling public (consumer) opinion to firms. NGOs engage with firms directly in several ways: through private regulation and corporate engagement—including benchmarking services (Boström and Klintman 2011)—as well as shareholder activism (Hamilton 2013). Outside market strategies are even more numerous, including not only ‘discursive’ actions such as email or social media campaigns, petitions or protests (Micheletti and Stolle 2005), but also tactics that use direct consumer power, such as boycotts, divestment and buycotts (targeted purchasing of particular products or labels) (Friedman 1999). In addition to organising these, groups can help citizens to make purchasing choices by screening products or running investigations into companies, as many consumer organisations have long done (Boström and Klintman 2011). This classification of strategies is outlined in Table 1.

Some previous research has examined how NGOs combine their strategies in the market. In contrast to interest group studies, the social movement literature has generally focused on the second and third types of combinations above: combining strategies on one issue sequentially or simultaneously. This is due to the stronger focus of social movement studies on campaigns as the unit of study. Across one campaign, groups first aim to create corporate change by questioning companies’ legitimacy using outside strategies, before using inside strategies to consult with companies and institutionalise new practices (den Hond and de Bakker 2007; den Hond et al. 2010). In private regulation also, NGOs must use outside strategies to create public pressure and demand for a particular eco-label, as well as inside strategies to help firms develop their policies—both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors (Gulbrandsen 2006; Bartley et al. 2015).



Table 1 List of strategies and tactics, developed from existing literature

	Inside	Outside
State	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Responding to written government/public consultations 2. Attending events organised by ministers, agencies or public bodies 3. Directly contacting policymakers, meeting with MPs, etc. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mass email/letter-writing campaigns to politicians or policymakers 2. Petitioning policymakers 3. Demonstrations or protests 4. Providing the public with information about a regulation/policy (through leaflets, web pages, etc.)
Market	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Consultancy or information services for companies ('corporate engagement') 2. Certification or eco-labelling 3. Shareholder activism 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Letter, email or social media campaigns against companies 2. Petitioning companies 3. Protesting companies (in-store, outside HQ, etc.) 4. Screening products or investigating companies 5. Calling for a boycott/divestment 6. Class action or legal action

Very limited work has examined both market- and state-based strategies. Kryst's (2012) study of the international Clean Clothes Campaign took a sequential approach similar to those above; NGOs first used outside strategies to raise awareness and set the agenda, before negotiating and collaborating with both the state and the market to regulate in both spheres. More linked to public policy, Gulbrandsen and Andresen (2004) include NGO targeting of industry, international and domestic institutions in their examination of NGO advocacy in implementing the Kyoto Protocol. However, they do not find significant evidence of company targeting, perhaps due to the complexity of the issue.

This research therefore presents two critical additions to the literature as it stands. First, it turns to the relatively unexamined use of market strategies in combination with state lobbying by NGOs, bringing together insights from interest group and social movement literature. Second, it provides a new way of measuring combinations of these strategies which captures both qualitative and quantitative differences when looking at group tactics on one issue or campaign, and allows for comparison among cases. It does this by using fuzzy set and QCA principles to sort cases into 'ideal-types' of combinations.

A configurational method to measure NGO strategies

Data

This paper examines a novel dataset of 24 NGO campaigns in two Western European countries (the UK and Italy) across four issues (cage eggs and poultry, ocean plastics, antibiotic use in farming and civil rights and technology). These issues were chosen purposively prior to data collection for variation on how likely market strategies were to be used based on the sensitivity of the issues (the link to public health



and safety), which has shown to be important for market-based activism (Schurman 2004). This was done with the aim of maximising the range of combinations of strategies found in the dataset (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009).

The two countries were chosen in a second step to increase variation in the number of strategies used. The UK and Italy are broadly comparable, as both are EU member states with no restrictions on NGO formation and representation. However, they also represent two different extremes for NGOs in western European politics for two reasons and this should change the type of strategies used in each country. First, they differ in levels of public interest in environmental, animal welfare and civil rights issues, with Italian citizens generally less interested or aware than those in the UK (European Commission 2016). Second, studies of consumer activism have found that Mediterranean countries—including Italy—have a lower level of public interest and participation, while the UK and Nordic countries have the highest levels (Stolle and Micheletti 2013). This seemingly higher public engagement in both the issues and consumer activism means that it should be easier for NGOs to use public, market-based strategies in the UK than in Italy. The two countries are therefore not included for a direct comparison, but rather to ensure a wide range of combinations are included in the data and therefore increase the external validity of the results to western European countries.

The unit of study was the issue campaign; cases were essentially all major campaigns in the past 5 years in each country on the issue. Issue campaigns were found through a first search of an existing database of NGO actions against companies and governments (Koenig 2017), supplemented by further Internet searches. As previously mentioned, an ‘issue campaign’ was defined as extended action on one issue by a group or coalition of groups, usually labelled a ‘campaign’ or ‘working area’ by the group itself. This required more than one action on an issue (so, for example, simply writing a submission to a public consultation would not count as a campaign). The final issue campaigns ranged from 6 to 18 months in duration, with an average length of 11 months. NGOs used between 2 and 13 different tactics per campaign, with an average of 5.3 (out of 16).

Data collection occurred in two stages. First, written primary sources (information from NGO websites and documents) and secondary sources (newspaper articles and industry publications) were gathered. After gaining an idea of the structure and actions in each issue campaign, extra data were collected through 16 semi-structured interviews with group representatives. Where possible, at least one interview was conducted per campaign; where it was not possible to get an interview, cases were dropped unless there was extensive online documentation. For those cases, extra questions were answered by email. As certain interviewees requested anonymity, issue campaigns in this paper are not referred to by name but rather by the topic and country of the campaign.³

³ Campaign factsheets and counts of tactics can be provided upon request by the author.



Raw measurements

After data collection, tactics were sorted into the four broad strategies presented in Table 1. This classifies individual tactics based on the target of the lobbying activity (state or market actors) and the audience that NGOs address (directly contacting the target, or mobilising public opinion). Strategies were thus grouped into four types: inside state (IS), outside state (OS), inside market (IM) and outside market (OM). This involved both prior theoretical classification and sorting based on the data collection. Tactics in previous studies have been extensively developed and tested for how well they fit the inside/outside typology, using, for example, factor analysis (Dür and Mateo 2016, pp. 78–79). The list of market strategies is based on these frameworks of state strategies and further literature (e.g. Boström and Klintman 2011; Micheletti 2003).⁴

Two tactics usually included in studies of lobbying were not included in this paper's count of strategies. Volunteer drives (e.g. beach clean-ups) are not directly political; where calls were for volunteers to pamphlet a local area or attend a protest, this was put under the appropriate tactic. Traditional media work (using press releases or contacting journalists) was also excluded from this study for two reasons. First, media strategies have increasingly been shown to be neither specifically inside nor outside, as they are used to address not only the public but also policymakers (Trapp and Laursen 2017). This was also brought up in several interviews, as respondents highlighted the need to choose newspapers that politicians also read. In addition, all groups in this sample used media strategies as a standard type of lobbying. This means that adding a 'media' strategy would add no meaningful variation, as it would be part of every combination.⁵ Nonetheless, in datasets where this *would vary* (for instance, with different group types that may be more or less prone to using press releases and media work) this could—and should—easily be included separately.

The raw score for each strategy was then calculated. First, each tactic that the group used was marked off. Certain tactics were weighted more heavily based on the relative resources they require (see Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Trevor Thall 2006; Dür and Mateo 2016). This weighted score was then converted to a proportion of the total possible tactics within each strategy. This is similar to the (raw) measurement method used in previous studies (Kriesi et al. 2007). One limitation of this method is the lack of weighting of each tactic based on the *intensity* with which it was used: an NGO that wrote one letter to policymakers and a group that wrote ten would receive the same score for this tactic. While this does mean that some nuance is lost,

⁴ Litigation (class actions) is included in the framework, despite being often left out of lobbying actions by groups. There is a growing literature on unions' recourse to litigation (e.g. Guillaume 2018), seen to be a last resort if change cannot be effected from within a company. In this framework they are included within the outside market strategies because of who they target and how: they aim to change firms through public mobilisation (as groups of people are necessary for class action), and often use this as a means to crowdfund or raise money for future actions.

⁵ This implies that for NGOs at a national level, media work is considered to be a baseline/standard part of their campaigns, whether or not they mostly target the market or the state.



it avoids inaccuracies in counting the exact number of times groups used a particular tactic (a particular risk with online or less institutionalised tactics). Moreover, differences among issue campaigns imply that the subsequent choice of the calibration of these scores would be necessarily arbitrary: for example, some groups choose to only target one firm for a whole campaign, while others target many; which group is more reliant on the market? In order to avoid potentially unjustifiable choices, tactics were thus weighted based on their resource intensity and not the total amount of times that they were used.⁶

Set membership calibration

After the calculation of the raw scores, fuzzy-set comparative analysis (fsQCA) was used to sort cases into type by the configurations of strategies that they used. This involved three steps: calibrating the raw scores into set membership scores; sorting the cases into a truth table; and logically minimising this truth table. After a brief introduction to QCA, each of these steps will be elaborated.

QCA and other set theoretic methods work using set relations rather than correlation. Cases are seen as configurations of variables that are analysed together, rather than analysing each variable separately (Rihoux and Lobe 2015). The method determines which cases belong to different condition and outcome sets to find the causal configurations leading to a particular outcome. Unlike case studies, which generally see cases as different manifestations of the same phenomenon, QCA examines patterns of difference (Ragin 1994). This makes it useful for typology-building, in which case characteristics are used as causal conditions and cases are sorted into different types based on the configurations of characteristics they present. Essentially, cases' fit into 'ideal-types' are calculated using fuzzy-set analysis (Gran 2003; Kvist 2007). In this study, cases can thus be distinguished by their characteristics—the strategies used in the campaign—and sorted into different 'ideal-types' according to these.

The concept of fuzzy sets was elaborated for use in the social sciences by Ragin (2008). Fuzzy sets allow researchers to include more nuance than dichotomised variables by allowing for partial degrees of membership within different sets. For instance, if an issue campaign scores 0.6 on outside market strategies, this means that the group does use outside market strategies (as membership is > 0.5) but is not fully reliant on them (as membership is < 1). It is important to note that these fuzzy sets are not the same as indexes or scales that standardise variables on a 0–1 scale: sets represent one concept (e.g. 'reliance on outside market strategies'), rather than simply measuring the extent to which a group uses outside strategies. Fuzzy-set scores thus capture both degree and type (Schneider and Wagemann 2012), which is the main difference between this set membership score and a simple measurement. Relevant degrees of quantitative difference are retained—the difference between

⁶ This was, however, also supplemented with weighting through the calibration thresholds, outlined below and in footnote 8. The non-weighted scores (with results) are provided in "Appendix 2" for comparison.



Table 2 Truth table of configurations of strategies

IS	OS	IM	OM	<i>n</i>	Cases
1	1	0	0	7	plas_uk1, plas_uk3, plas_uk4, antib_it1, plas_it2, plas_it3, dig_it1
0	0	1	1	4	eggs_uk1, eggs_uk2, eggs_it1, eggs_it2
1	1	0	1	3	antib_uk1, plas_uk2, digi_uk2
1	1	1	1	3	eggs_uk4, antib_it2, plas_it1
0	0	0	1	2	eggs_uk3, antib_uk3
1	0	1	0	2	digi_uk1, plas_it4
0	0	1	0	1	antib_uk2
1	0	0	0	1	digi_uk3
1	0	1	1	1	digi_it2
0	0	0	0	0	
0	1	0	0	0	
0	1	0	1	0	
0	1	1	0	0	
0	1	1	1	0	
1	0	0	1	0	
1	1	1	0	0	

IS inside state, *OS* outside state, *IM* inside market, *OM* outside market, *n* number of cases

groups whose campaigns use a high proportion of tactics from one strategy—while the relative qualitative difference is also captured, between groups that used a strategy at all and those that did not.

After gathering raw data on the proportion of each type of strategy used in each campaign, these were calibrated into fuzzy-set membership scores. Sets were calibrated using the direct method of calibration (Ragin 2008, p. 89).⁷ Calibration thresholds were chosen so that a group using (the weighted equivalent of) at least one of the tactics (for inside strategies) and at least two of the tactics (for outside strategies) scored >0.5⁸; full membership required at least two-thirds of the tactics within a strategy to be used. These thresholds were based on what the ‘ideal’ use of each strategy would look like: in other words, what groups would need to do to fully belong to each set. This two-thirds threshold was chosen as using *all* the tactics in one strategy was too high a bar to set: most groups lack the resources and time during their campaigns to diversify to this extent. The resulting membership score essentially provides a measure of the intensity at which an NGO used a strategy during its campaign: the higher its score, the more intensely the strategy was used.

⁷ The direct method of calibration plots all cases onto a logistic function around thresholds that the researcher has set.

⁸ Two tactics were used for outside strategies because of (a) the lower cost of using such actions, particularly those in the market; and (b) to further weight strategies and even out calibration, because of the higher number of possible raw scores (there are more individual tactics in both outside strategies than in inside ones, meaning more chance of a higher score).



If the case scores under 0.5, the strategy was not used to any relevant degree. All calibration tables and XY plots of calibrated scores are available in “Appendix 1”.

Cases were then sorted into a truth table with each type of strategy as a condition. The main analytical tool in QCA, the truth table organises cases based on their membership in conditions and outcomes (Ragin 2008).⁹ It shows the configurations of strategies that were present, the number of cases belonging to each configuration and the rows with no empirical manifestations. As is clear from the truth table, the cases group into a few main combinations: 17 of the 24 cases fall into four truth table rows (Table 2).

The truth table was then logically minimised to find the ‘core’ expressions that capture meaningful variation in the data. This uses QCA’s potential for inductive exploration of the data and allows us to isolate the simplest way of expressing each cluster of cases. These basic expressions are presented in the following section, with examples from the cases themselves; their broader implications are discussed afterwards.¹⁰

Configurations of strategies: results

Table 3 shows each core expression and cluster of cases, as well as their membership scores.

Specialisation in the state: IS*~IM*~OM¹¹

The first minimised cluster refers to issue campaigns using neither inside nor outside market strategies—using state strategies only. This expression covers eight cases.

It is interesting to note that the expression refers only to the presence of inside state strategies. This is because OS is a subset of IS: in other words, all campaigns that use state strategies use inside state strategies (even if they also use outside state strategies). This has interesting implications for our understanding of access, a finding which is discussed further below.

Specialisation in the market: ~IS*~OS*OM

The second minimised cluster covers all cases that use *only* strategies in the market, except one (antib_uk2). This covered 6 cases, all in the topic of animal welfare (eggs and antibiotics).

⁹ This truth table does not have an outcome, given that the QCA is being used for sorting rather than causal analysis.

¹⁰ Two other options for clustering were also tested. The first was to theoretically cluster the data into cases using only state strategies, only market strategies and combinations, and then to minimise each cluster separately (“Appendix 1”). The results for this were slightly simpler, but do not differ drastically from the results presented here. The second alternative was to run the analysis by *audience addressed* (state, market and the public); however, this was unsuitable for this dataset, as discussed in “Appendix 3”.

¹¹ Boolean notation uses * to represent the intersection of sets (logical AND), + to represent the union of sets (logical OR) and ~ to represent the negation of the set.



Table 3 Core expressions and membership scores

Cluster	Expression	Cases (membership scores)
State only	IS*~IM*~OM	plas_uk1 (0.97), plas_uk3 (0.96), plas_uk4 (0.76), plas_it2 (0.76), plas_it3 (0.76), antib_it1 (0.76), digi_uk3 (0.85), digi_it1 (0.76)
Market only	~IS*~OS*OM	eggs_uk1 (0.67), eggs_uk2 (0.67), eggs_uk3 (0.55), eggs_it1 (0.79), eggs_it2 (0.67), antib_uk3 (0.55)
Market and combinations	~OS*IM	eggs_uk1 (0.67), eggs_uk2 (0.67), eggs_it1 (0.79), eggs_it2 (0.67), antib_uk2 (0.89), plas_it4 (0.67), digi_uk1 (0.67), digi_it2 (0.57)
Combinations	IS*OS*OM	eggs_uk4 (0.55), antib_uk1 (0.55), antib_it2 (0.79), plas_uk2 (0.57), plas_it1 (0.67), digi_uk2 (0.76)

IS inside state, OS outside state, IM inside market, OM outside market



The results here are the opposite of those in the state: only outside market strategies appear in the core expression as all but one case using only market strategies used outside strategies. Some of these combined these outside strategies with inside strategies. A common pattern shared by many of the campaigns against cage eggs (eggs_uk1, eggs_uk2, eggs_it1 and eggs_it2), for instance, was to use outside market strategies first to draw public attention to a particular company using cage eggs in their products and to use public pressure to encourage the company to meet with them. This meeting often turned into corporate engagement, with the NGO helping the company to audit their supply chain and create a plan to move away from using cage eggs. Even when the company refused to change, most of these campaigns started with public, outside strategies against firms, which explains why outside market strategies were the important part of this core expression.

The only exception to this rule was antib_uk2, which used only inside market strategies. This campaign was started by an NGO that specialises in shareholder activism; as a result, the entire campaign focuses on promoting shareholders' responsibilities and using shareholder resolutions as a mechanism for change. The NGO only used one outside strategy—a petition—but this was too low-weighted to be included in the final score. Moreover, interviewees highlighted that the petition was a once-off and a small effort to show public support for their campaign. Apart from this highly specialised campaign, then, the majority of market campaigns followed a similar outside–inside pattern.

Market and combinations: ~OS*IM

The third minimised cluster refers to cases that use inside market strategies but do *not* use outside state strategies. This covers many of the same cases as the previous one; those that are covered are the cases that use both inside and outside market strategies. Antib_uk2, the case explained above, falls into this expression. However, it also covers three cases that combine state and market lobbying: digi_it2, plas_it4 and digi_uk1.

Digi_it2 and plas_it4 used inside state strategies, combined with both inside and outside market strategies. In both cases, this was because the issue campaigns were mostly oriented at firms but were also connected to ongoing public policy debates; both NGOs therefore made the most of their prior connections with policymakers to meet and discuss the topics. Digi_uk1, on the other hand, used *only* inside strategies. This campaign centred on a private agreement between internet service providers and the government to block certain websites. There was thus no official legislation (or company policy) for them to officially campaign against; this made it very difficult for them to use any outside strategies, so they focused on using inside market strategies to *show* that the providers were blocking websites, and then meeting with and submitting their evidence to the parliament. Obviously, this case is rather special and may be quite a unique case as it worked with very minimal public mobilisation; however, it does show the potential of even inside market strategies to supplement and/or provide evidence for state-based lobbying.



Combinations: IS*OS*OM

The final minimised cluster covers cases that use other combinations of state and market strategies. This includes three cases that use all four strategies (eggs_uk4, antib_it2 and plast_it1) as well as cases that use state strategies and outside market strategies.

These cases generally work in quite similar ways. Antib_it2, for instance, is an issue campaign by a consumer organisation for a national antibiotics strategy. In addition to their domestic, state-based advocacy, they included market-based tactics with the help of their international umbrella organisation, which provided them with an online platform to host a petition asking the major chicken producers to support the government's antibiotics plan and to create their own action plans as well. Digi_uk2, on the other hand, is a state-targeted issue campaign against the use of facial recognition technology by UK police. It combined inside and outside advocacy in the state (meetings with decision-makers and reports, as well as petitions) with a legal case against the producer of facial recognition technology and the departments using them. In both of these cases, therefore, outside market strategies were used to support state campaigning by raising public awareness. This is further discussed below.

Key results and discussion

The method used here successfully captures both the combinations of strategies and the degree to which they are used in each issue campaign. The clustering and minimisation of the core characteristics of each group of cases leads to some two interesting insights into the relation between inside and outside strategies in the state and the market. These are the difference in how inside and outside strategies are used in the state and the market, and the ways that market strategies were used in combinations and alone.

A first interesting finding was that inside and outside strategies were used differently in the state and the market. In the state, inside strategies were *always* used when NGOs targeted the state with their advocacy. This suggests that inside strategies are the 'core' of a state-based campaign, with outside state strategies a way of drawing attention to these inside tactics. This is somewhat surprising, given the general consensus in the interest group literature that NGOs use more outside strategies and draw more advantages from involving the public in their lobbying (Dür and Mateo 2016; Junk 2016). However, it also ties in with previous findings that NGOs and other interest groups target the parliament at about the same rate; public interest groups, however, are more likely to use public strategies with their parliamentary strategies (Binderkrantz 2008). This reinforces the importance of looking at the combinations of strategies used in advocacy on one issue—particularly which strategies do and do not occur together—rather than purely the frequency with which strategies are used. Outside state strategies are frequently used in the dataset and are an important part of CSOs' action repertoires; however, they are important *in combination with* inside strategies and always occur together with these.



When NGOs targeted only the market with their campaigns, in contrast, outside market strategies were almost always used—the only exception being the shareholder activist group discussed above. This is not so surprising. It would seem difficult for a group to use *only* inside market strategies; market strategies rely on the public knowing about a campaign, requiring a group to try to increase consumer awareness and demand before using inside strategies. This also ties in with what has previously been found: NGOs first use outside market strategies to increase consumer awareness and pressure, before moving on to more institutionalised or inside strategies (den Hond and de Bakker 2007; den Hond et al. 2010). Therefore, while inside strategies were the ‘core’ of state-based advocacy, outside market strategies were the main part of advocacy in the market. This also highlights a fundamental difference between the state and the market in terms of political activity: while democratic political systems usually have some measures to allow groups to participate in politics, the market is naturally more closed and groups may need to use outside strategies in order to gain access.

The second finding was that there seem to be two distinct types of issue campaigns using market strategies. In the first, groups combine market and state strategies (9 of the 24 cases in this study). Here, market strategies are used to strengthen and support inside state lobbying by drawing public attention to an issue and providing a way for the public to take part in a campaign.¹² In the second type of issue campaign, groups target *only* the market, as in 7 of the 24 cases here. These market-only campaigns should perhaps not be referred to as ‘lobbying’ at all, as they aim only to change company behaviour. Indeed, traditional definitions of ‘lobbying’ and social movement activity have often restricted the term to attempts to influence public policy (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, p. 34; Tarrow 2011). Nonetheless, over half the campaigns using market strategies in this dataset combine market strategies with state ones, implying that a lot of the time, these strategies are actually used to supplement traditional advocacy on public policy. This creates a strong case for studying these market strategies as a phenomenon that is sometimes separate from, but often linked to, NGOs’ state-based, political lobbying strategies.

Conclusions

The literature on interest groups and NGO lobbying as it currently stands falls short in two ways. First, there have been very few attempts to combine insights from interest group and social movement literature to study groups’ actions in both the state and the market. Second, current proportional methods often fail to properly capture the combinations of strategies that groups use during their advocacy in a way that can be systematically studied. In this article I have proposed using a new approach

¹² It is particularly interesting that two combinations are not found in the data: no groups supported their market lobbying with outside state strategies (IM*OM*OS), and none supported their state strategies with inside market lobbying only (IS*OS*IM). This lends further support to the explanation of market strategies as mobilising the public.



based on fuzzy-set QCA methodology. This not only captures combinations of strategies and clusters cases based on the data at hand, but also expresses the degree to which groups use each combination of strategies. The result is a rich and useful measurement of combinations of strategies in NGO campaigns, which has also led to insights into how Western European NGOs combine strategies in the state and the market.

The two main findings of the paper have some implications on how we understand NGO strategies and how they address different targets with their advocacy. First, they show the importance of examining combinations of strategies within a whole campaign on one issue, and particularly how certain strategies may work sequentially. The findings that there is a particular ‘order’ for market strategies, for instance, raises questions of how this sequence works in combinations of state and market strategies. Future research could work to include this temporality into a similar measurement strategy, moving beyond the case-based evidence presented here. Second, the findings show that the inside–outside division in interest group studies is not wrong, but lacking. By not examining market strategies separately to other outside strategies, we overlook how NGOs may try to mobilise the public by appealing to them as consumers of particular brands. This is relevant even when examining public policy, as groups used market strategies to campaign for public policy or regulation. NGOs can appeal to their supporters as not only political, but also economic actors, and use this leverage to influence public policymaking.

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of interest The author states that there is no conflict of interest.

Appendix 1: Weighted tactics

Comparison of raw scores and calibrated scores

	Inside state (IS)		Outside state (OS)		Inside market (IM)		Outside market (OM)	
	Raw	Calibrated	Raw	Calibrated	Raw	Calibrated	Raw	Calibrated
eggs_uk1	0	0.05	0	0.05	0.33	0.67	0.55	0.97
eggs_uk2	0	0.05	0	0.05	0.33	0.67	0.33	0.79
eggs_uk3	0	0.05	0	0.05	0	0.05	0.22	0.55
eggs_uk4	1	0.99	0.6	0.97	0.83	0.99	0.22	0.55
antib_uk1	1	0.99	0.4	0.76	0	0.05	0.22	0.55
antib_uk2	0	0.05	0	0.05	0.5	0.89	0.11	0.21
antib_uk3	0	0.05	0.2	0.27	0	0.05	0.22	0.55
plas_uk1	1	0.99	0.6	0.97	0	0.05	0	0.05
plas_uk2	0.25	0.57	0.4	0.76	0	0.05	0.55	0.97



	Inside state (IS)		Outside state (OS)		Inside market (IM)		Outside market (OM)	
	Raw	Calibrated	Raw	Calibrated	Raw	Calibrated	Raw	Calibrated
plas_uk3	0.75	0.96	0.6	0.97	0	0.05	0	0.05
plas_uk4	1	0.99	0.4	0.76	0	0.05	0	0.05
digi_uk1	0.75	0.96	0.2	0.27	0.33	0.67	0.11	0.21
digi_uk2	1	0.99	0.4	0.76	0	0.05	0.33	0.79
digi_uk3	0.5	0.85	0.2	0.27	0	0.05	0	0.05
eggs_it1	0	0.05	0.2	0.27	0.83	0.99	0.33	0.79
eggs_it2	0	0.05	0	0.05	0.33	0.67	0.33	0.79
antib_it1	0.75	0.96	0.4	0.76	0	0.05	0	0.05
antib_it2	0.75	0.96	0.4	0.76	0.83	0.99	0.33	0.79
plas_it1	0.5	0.85	0.4	0.76	0.33	0.67	0.33	0.79
plas_it2	1	0.99	0.4	0.76	0	0.05	0	0.05
plas_it3	0.25	0.57	0.4	0.76	0	0.05	0	0.05
plas_it4	0.75	0.96	0.2	0.27	0.33	0.67	0.11	0.21
dig_it1	0.75	0.96	0.4	0.76	0	0.05	0	0.05
digi_it2	0.25	0.57	0	0.05	0.33	0.67	0.44	0.92

Weighting of tactics

	Inside	Outside
State	Responding to written government/public consultations Attending events organised by ministers, agencies or public bodies Directly contacting policymakers, meeting with MPs, etc.	Mass email/letter-writing campaigns to politicians or policymakers Petitioning policymakers Demonstrations or protests Providing the public with information about a regulation/policy (through leaflets, web pages, etc.)
Market	Consultancy or information services for companies ('corporate engagement') Certification or eco-labelling Shareholder activism	Letter, email or social media campaigns against companies Petitioning companies Protesting companies (in-store, outside HQ, etc.) Screening products or investigating companies Calling for a boycott/divestment Class action or legal action



This was a very simple weighting system: more resource-intensive tactics were worth two or three in the count of all tactics

Bold = weighted two times

Bold + italic = weighted three times

These are based on previous studies examining the resources necessary for different tactics in the state and the market (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Trevor Thall 2006; Boström and Klintman 2011; Dür and Mateo 2016)

Theoretical minimisation


Cases were first split into theoretical clusters (those targeting the state only, those targeting the market only and those using combinations of both state and market lobbying) and then minimised by cluster. The minimised expression represents the core expression capturing each cluster.

Cluster	Expression	Cases
State only	$\sim IM^* \sim OM$	Plas_uk1, plas_uk3, plas_uk4, plas_it2, plas_it3, antib_it1, digi_uk3, digi_it1
Market only	$\sim IS$	Eggs_uk1, eggs_uk2, eggs_uk3, eggs_it1, eggs_it2, antib_uk2, antib_uk3
Combinations	IS^*IM	Eggs_uk4, plas_it1, plas_it4, antib_it2, digi_uk1, digi_it2
Combinations	IS^*OM	eggs_uk4, plas_uk2, plas_it1, antib_uk1, antib_it2, digi_uk2, digi_it2





XY plots and histograms



Inside state





Outside state



Inside market



Outside market



Appendix 2: Unweighted tactics

Comparison of raw scores and calibrated scores

	Inside state (IS)		Outside state (OS)		Inside market (IM)		Outside market (OM)	
	Raw	Calibrated	Raw	Calibrated	Raw	Calibrated	Raw	Calibrated
eggs_uk1	0	0.05	0	0.05	0.25	0.58	0.67	0.95
eggs_uk2	0	0.05	0	0.05	0.25	0.58	0.33	0.57
eggs_uk3	0	0.05	0	0.05	0	0.05	0.5	0.84
eggs_uk4	1	1	0.75	0.99	0.5	0.87	0.5	0.84
antib_uk1	1	1	0.5	0.67	0	0.05	0.33	0.57
antib_uk2	0	0.05	0	0.05	0.5	0.87	0.17	0.21
antib_uk3	0	0.05	0.25	0.21	0	0.05	0.33	0.57
plas_uk1	1	1	0.75	0.99	0	0.05	0.17	0.21
plas_uk2	0.33	0.58	0.5	0.67	0	0.05	0.67	0.95
plas_uk3	0.67	0.97	0.75	0.99	0	0.05	0	0.05
plas_uk4	1	1	0.5	0.67	0	0.05	0	0.05
digi_uk1	0.67	0.97	0.25	0.21	0.25	0.58	0.17	0.21
digi_uk2	1	1	0.5	0.67	0	0.05	0.17	0.21
digi_uk3	0.33	0.58	0.25	0.21	0	0.05	0.17	0.21
eggs_it1	0	0.05	0.25	0.21	0.5	0.87	0.5	0.84
eggs_it2	0	0.05	0	0.05	0.25	0.58	0.5	0.84
antib_it1	0.67	0.97	0.5	0.67	0	0.05	0	0.05
antib_it2	0.67	0.97	0.5	0.67	0.5	0.87	0.5	0.84
plas_it1	0.33	0.58	0.5	0.67	0.25	0.58	0.5	0.84
plas_it2	1	1	0.5	0.67	0.25	0.58	0	0.05
plas_it3	0.33	0.58	0.5	0.67	0.25	0.58	0	0.05
plas_it4	0.67	0.97	0.25	0.21	0.5	0.87	0.17	0.21
dig_it1	0.67	0.97	0.5	0.67	0	0.05	0	0.05
digi_it2	0.33	0.58	0	0.05	0.25	0.58	0.33	0.57

Truth table and minimisation

Cluster (theoretical)	IS	OS	IM	OM	<i>n</i>	Cases
State	1	1	0	0	6	plas_uk1, plas_uk3, plas_uk4, digi_uk2, antib_it1, digi_it1
Market	0	0	1	1	4	eggs_uk1, eggs_uk2, eggs_it1, eggs_it2
Combination	1	1	1	1	3	eggs_uk4, antib_it2, plas_it1
Market	0	0	0	1	2	eggs_uk3, antib_uk3
Combination	1	0	1	0	2	digi_uk1, plas_it4



Cluster (theoretical)	IS	OS	IM	OM	<i>n</i>	Cases
Combination	1	1	0	1	2	antib_uk1, plas_uk2
Combination	1	1	1	0	2	plas_it2, plas_it3
Market	0	0	1	0	1	antib_uk2
State	1	0	0	0	1	digi_uk3
Combination	1	0	1	1	1	digi_it2
	0	0	0	0	0	
	0	1	0	0	0	
	0	1	0	1	0	
	0	1	1	0	0	
	0	1	1	1	0	
	1	0	0	1	0	

IS inside state, *OS* outside state, *IM* inside market, *OM* outside market

Minimisation (inductive)

All cases were minimised together. The minimised expression represents the key differences between all cases.

Expression	Cases (membership scores)	Cluster
IS*OS	plas_uk1 (0.99), plas_uk2 (0.58), plas_uk3 (0.97), plas_uk4 (0.67), plas_it1 (0.58), plas_it2 (0.67), plas_it3 (0.58), digi_uk2 (0.67), dig_it1 (0.67), antib_uk1 (0.67), antib_it1 (0.67), antib_it2 (0.67), eggs_uk4 (0.99)	State + combinations
IS*~OM	plas_uk1 (0.79), plas_uk3 (0.95), plas_uk4 (0.95), plas_it2 (0.95), plas_it3 (0.58), plas_it4 (0.79), digi_uk1 (0.79), digi_uk2 (0.79), digi_uk3 (0.58), digi_it1 (0.95), antib_it1 (0.95)	State + combinations
~OS*IM	plas_it4 (0.79), eggs_uk1 (0.58), eggs_uk2 (0.58), eggs_it1 (0.79), eggs_it2 (0.84), digi_uk1 (0.58), digi_it2 (0.58), antib_uk2 (0.87)	Market + combinations
~IS*~OS*OM	eggs_uk1 (0.95), eggs_uk2 (0.57), eggs_uk3 (0.84), eggs_it1 (0.79), eggs_it2 (0.84), antib_uk3 (0.57)	Market only

Minimisation (theoretical)

Cases were first split into theoretical clusters (those targeting the state only, those targeting the market only and those using combinations of both state and market lobbying) and then minimised by cluster. The minimised expression represents the core expression capturing each cluster.



Cluster	Expression	Cases (membership scores)
State	~IM*~OM	plas_uk1 (0.79), plas_uk3 (0.95), plas_uk4 (0.67), digi_uk2 (0.67), digi_uk3 (0.58), digi_it1(0.67), antib_it1 (0.67)
Market	~IS	eggs_uk1(0.58), eggs_uk2 (0.58), eggs_uk3 (0.84), eggs_it1 (0.79), eggs_it2 (0.58), antib_uk2 (0.87), antib_uk3 (0.57)
Combination	IS*IM	plas_it1 (0.58), plas_it2 (0.58), plas_it3 (0.58), plas_it4 (0.79), digi_uk1 (0.58), digi_it2 (0.67), eggs_uk4 (0.84), antib_it2 (0.67)





Cluster	Expression	Cases (membership scores)
Combination	IS*OM	eggs_uk4 (0.84), antib_uk1 (0.57), plas_uk2 (0.58), antib_it2 (0.84), plas_it1 (0.84), digi_it2 (0.57)

XY plots and histograms



Inside state





Outside state



Inside market



Outside market



Appendix 3: Three audiences

This approach was used to test the impact of splitting up the strategies differently and basing the analysis not only the inside/outside divide, but rather by the audience that groups address with each of the strategies. Public strategies were those targeting public opinion or aiming to signal this to firms or policymakers; state strategies were those directly targeted at public policymaking institutions; and market



strategies were those targeting firms directly. Such an approach could be made more fine-grained by including, e.g. different policymaking institutions [‘bureaucrats’ vs. ‘parliaments’, for instance, Binderkrantz (2005)], if these data were available.

The drawback to this approach for these cases was that all combinations were found in the data; the minimisation is therefore too simple to be meaningful. However, this has been included below as a demonstration of how such a division of strategies could work.

Comparison of raw scores and calibrated scores

	State		Market		Public	
	Raw	Calibrated	Raw	Calibrated	Raw	Calibrated
eggs_uk1	0	0.05	0.33	0.67	0.56	0.93
eggs_uk2	0	0.05	0.33	0.67	0.33	0.73
eggs_uk3	0	0.05	0	0.05	0.22	0.54
eggs_uk4	1	0.99	0.83	0.99	0.33	0.73
antib_uk1	1	0.99	0	0.05	0.22	0.54
antib_uk2	0	0.05	0.5	0.89	0.11	0.21
antib_uk3	0	0.05	0	0.05	0.22	0.54
plas_uk1	1	0.99	0	0.05	0.33	0.73
plas_uk2	0.25	0.57	0	0.05	0.56	0.93
plas_uk3	0.75	0.96	0	0.05	0.33	0.73
plas_uk4	1	0.99	0	0.05	0.22	0.54
digi_uk1	0.75	0.96	0.33	0.67	0.11	0.21
digi_uk2	1	0.99	0	0.05	0.56	0.93
digi_uk3	0.5	0.85	0	0.05	0.11	0.21
eggs_it1	0	0.05	0.83	0.99	0.33	0.73
eggs_it2	0	0.05	0.33	0.67	0.33	0.73
antib_it1	0.75	0.96	0	0.05	0.22	0.54
antib_it2	0.75	0.96	0.83	0.99	0.33	0.73
plas_it1	0.5	0.85	0.33	0.67	0.33	0.73
plas_it2	1	0.99	0	0.05	0.22	0.54
plas_it3	0.25	0.57	0	0.05	0.22	0.54
plas_it4	0.75	0.96	0.33	0.67	0.11	0.21
dig_it1	0.75	0.96	0	0.05	0.22	0.54
digi_it2	0.25	0.57	0.33	0.67	0.44	0.86



Truth table and minimisation

State	Market	Public	<i>n</i>	Cases
1	0	1	10	plas_uk1, plas_uk2, plas_uk3, plas_uk4, plas_it2, plas_it3, antib_uk1, antib_it1, digi_uk2, digi_it1
0	1	1	4	eggs_uk1, eggs_uk2, eggs_it1, eggs_it2
1	1	1	4	eggs_uk4, plas_it1, antib_it2, digi_it2
0	0	1	2	eggs_uk3, antib_uk3
1	1	0	2	plas_it4, digi_uk1
0	1	0	1	antib_uk2
1	0	0	1	digi_uk3
0	0	0	0	

We can see here that there is at least one campaign that uses each type of strategy. This means that the minimisation simply leads to STATE, MARKET and PUBLIC.

Some interesting points do arise: the most common campaign type by far is to target policymakers directly and supplement this with public-oriented strategies. It is less common to target *only* policymakers or firms directly, but four campaigns do use only direct strategies. This is an interesting insight, as it runs counter to many of the theoretical assumptions about NGOs and how they usually run their campaigns (with some form of public-oriented tactic).

This could be an interesting approach to move beyond a focus on inside and outside strategies, and could be adapted by (for example) including media strategies separately; including different group types (and seeing where they cluster); including different institutions or levels within STATE or MARKET, using more fine-grained data.

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