Cooperative games and mechanisms for division problems

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Propositions

accompanying the thesis

COOPERATIVE GAMES AND MECHANISMS FOR DIVISION PROBLEMS

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1. If the core can be described by two bounds, then the nucleolus and the egalitarian core admit closed-form expressions. (Chapter 2)

2. The egalitarian core for two-bound core games is single-valued. (Chapter 2)

3. Reduced two-bound core games are two-bound core games. (Chapter 3)

4. Choose the constrained equal awards rule and divide. (Chapter 4)

5. An agent gets more than other agents if he is more inclined to share. (Chapter 5)

6. If everyone strictly prefers 0 to 1, then someone has to be sacrificed. (Chapter 5)

7. Brilliant conclusions tend to include complex arguments but simple expressions.

8. "Know thy self, know thy enemy. A thousand battles, a thousand victories".

   - Sun Tzu: *The Art of War*

9. "Do not worry if there is not enough to go around, only worry if it is not evenly distributed".

   - *The Analects of Confucius*