Learning who not to vote for

Learning who not to vote for: The role of parental socialization in the development of negative partisanship

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we explore the importance of negative orientations towards political parties in the political socialization process. We extend the traditional idea that children adopt a certain positive party attachment from their parents, and also take into account the possibility that the family can play an important role in the development of negative partisanship. We test the assumption that within the family, children learn both about the 'good ones' and the 'bad ones' of the political world, and analyze intergenerational similarities in positive and negative orientations towards the different political parties in the Flemish (Belgium) landscape. Results show that parental socialization can indeed work in two directions. Intergenerational similarity is not only observed in support – as could be expected from earlier research – but can also be observed, to a similar extent, for explicit negative orientations. This is particularly the case for parties at the far ends of the political spectrum such as the radical right Vlaams Belang (and to a lesser extent for the Green party), but this logic also applies for more mainstream, established parties, such as the Christian democrats.

1. Introduction

Parental socialization is a key element in the study on the development of party identification. While contested by revisionist scholars, the classic assumption that party identification is developed early in life, in the first place through parental socialization, still remains supported by recent empirical evidence (Fitzgerald, 2011; Hooghe and Boonen, 2015; Jennings et al., 2009; Kroh and Selb, 2009). We aim to extent our understanding of this socialization mechanism, by expanding on one particular element that has been underexposed in partisanship literature: the importance of the negative evaluations of 'the others', or the out-group aspect of partisanship. We focus on the development of negative orientations towards political parties, within adolescence, through parental socialization.

The importance of negative partisanship has received renewed scholarly attention over the past years, among others thanks to the contribution of Medeiros and Noël on the 'forgotten side of partisanship' (Medeiros and Noël, 2014). They use the two-round French presidential elections in 2002 as a striking example of how negative evaluations can affect vote choice. In these infamous elections, the fragmentation on the left led to an unprecedented second round in which the conservative Jacques Chirac fought the radical right Jean-Marie Le Pen for presidency. Leftist voters were mobilized under the motto 'Vote for the crook, not for the fascist', and eventually elected Chirac based on a purely negatively inspired motivation. The same

happened in the 2015 regional elections, in which a number of Socialist candidates even withdrew their candidacy to maximize the chances of the rightist 'Les Républicains' in their battle against the Front National led by Marine Le Pen. This eventually appeared to be a very successful strategy, as the Front National lost the elections in the second round in every region. Another example stems from Garry's study (2007) on negative and positive party identities in Northern Ireland. His study suggests that for Northern-Irish Protestant voters, a negative attitude towards the Nationalist Sinn Féin is a stronger predictor of a Protestant DUP vote than a positive attitude towards this Protestant party (DUP) itself. Finally, the 2016 presidential elections in the United States seemed to show a very similar dynamic, in which for a share of the electorate, a democratic vote was regularly depicted as 'the lesser of two evils' (Sweetser, 2017).

These examples hint upon the possible and far-reaching consequences of an outspoken tendency to *not* support a party: in rare cases, such as the most recent presidential elections in the United States, a strong motivation *not* to vote for a particular party can affect voting behavior more strongly than a positive preference for or identification with a particular party. We aim to contribute to our understanding of this type of negative partisanship by focusing on the developmental phase of this phenomenon. If negative orientations towards 'the others' are indeed a core determinant of political behavior, it is important to embed this dimension in the developmental models of political learning as well.

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Party identification literature strongly builds on social learning theory to understand the importance of social surroundings for the development of an in-group attachment (Greene, 2004). The most immediate and important social surrounding affecting this attachment has always been the family (Jennings and Niemi, 1968, 1981; Zuckerman et al., 2007). The classic model prescribes that parents who support a certain party provide clear, strong, homogeneous and stable cues which will in turn be internalized and reproduced by their children, mostly in the essential developmental phase of adolescence. A traditional example of these communicative cues could be 'In this family, we are Republicans' (Greenstein, 1965). Until now, however, this classic political socialization process has only been approached from an in-group point of view, although the implicit assumption of this learning process is that parents can guide their children not only in understanding who are the 'good ones', but also in explicitly naming the 'bad ones' (the out-group(s)) in the political world (Dinas, 2014). We want to empirically assess whether the immediate family context indeed also shapes the development of negative orientations towards parties, using sets of propensity to vote scores as in a multiparty context as comparative indicators.

Although this expectation might seem self-evident, following social learning theory, this is not necessarily the case, as this theory is primarily based on *positive reinforcement* (Jennings et al., 2009): parents have a strong affective in-group attachment towards a certain political party, which is communicated in clearly observable cues. The affective in-group attachment is in turn internalized by children, who develop a similar group attachment, and this attachment will be reinforced and supported when they externalize this in certain behaviors or discussions. Following this logic, we might expect negative cues towards other parties to be at least less visible and less salient, although expressing a negative opinion towards a particular party can of course also be seen a desired behavior that deserves parental reinforcement.

Tackling this puzzle empirically is challenging, as we need to disentangle positive from negative partisanship. To do so, we will not focus on a one-dimensional two-party system such as the United States, in which supporting party A goes hand in hand with not-supporting party B (in the original operationalization of party identification - a scale from Strong Republican to Strong Democrat - both could not even be empirically disentangled from one another). We focus on a West-European multidimensional party system (Flanders, Belgium) in which individuals have the possibility of expressing both positive and negative view on different political parties at the same time.

Flanders has a fragmented party system with a wide variety of both traditional centrist parties and 'new' post-materialist, single issue and radical right parties, which provides us with a suitable setting of evaluating the intergenerational similarities negative orientations, as supporting party A does not necessarily imply not-supporting the other parties in the diverse political landscape. The downside, however, is that in this specific context, we need to be careful in labeling certain orientations as positive and negative *identifications*. Theoretically, real party identification implies more than a vote choice (or a consideration to vote) and has an essential social identity component to it as well. Therefore, in the operationalization and analyses, we will refer to positive and negative *orientations* towards parties, as due to data limitations we are bound to rely on a more limited operationalization of *voting propensities* as our main dependent variable. The data for this paper stem from the Parent-Child Socialization Study (PCSS, 2012–2013), conducted in the Flemish region of Belgium.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. The relevance of negative partisanship

In its original concept, party identification was defined as a psychological group attachment, in which the feeling of belonging to a certain group-object is the key element. A second key element,

however, that results directly from this identification with an in-group, is the 'repelling' element in the definition, a key element in the original concept that has only received a modest amount of attention in partisanship studies:

> Party identification is an (…) *affective orientation to an important group-object in his environment. Both reference group theory and small-group studies of influence have converged upon the **attracting or repelling** quality of the group as the generalized dimension most critical in defining the individual-group relationship, and it is this dimension that we will call identification.*' (Campbell et al., 1960: 121–122, emphasis added)

This negative dimension has been shown to be very important, as it can strongly and directly affect political behavior in various ways (Caruana et al., 2014; Garry, 2007). Important to note, and key for the implications of the current study, is that negative orientations towards political parties should not be considered as opposite equivalents of positive orientations (Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977). Medeiros and Noël (2014) underscore that they should not be regarded as a marginal factor that goes hand in hand with a positive appreciation or identification with a party. Particularly when it comes to the implications of these negative orientations, they might even have more far-reaching consequences than the positive self-perceived group identification with a political party. Caruana et al. (2014) show that what they call 'the dark side of partisanship' not only affects voting behavior, but also turnout and participatory activities related and unrelated to political parties.

As mentioned above, the theoretical framework of these first explorations on negative partisanship is strongly embedded within the conceptualization of partisanship as a social identity, in which both the in-group and the out-group are essential components (Greene, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This conceptualization also connects closely to the traditional Michigan Group approach to partisanship (Campbell et al., 1960). In multiparty settings – such as the Belgian context in this study – it has been shown to be challenging to apply and operationalize the same partisanship theory directly (Thomassen and Rosema, 2009), as it is difficult to disentangle vote choice from identification. However, new studies have shown that we might have been underestimating the continuing importance of partisanship in explaining political activity, also in European multi-party contexts, particularly because of measurement challenges (Bankert et al., 2017). Based on these new insights and new measurement instruments, Bankert et al. (2017) also make a case for exploring the negative side of partisanship in European multiparty contexts further (suggesting measures such as "When people criticize X, it makes me feel good").

At this point, however, the concept (and operationalization) of negative partisanship has not been strongly developed (Mayer, 2017). A few key elements are important to mention. First and foremost, positive and negative orientations towards political parties are not unidimensional: they are not necessarily two ends of the same scale (Medeiros and Noël, 2014). Positive feelings towards the in-group may produce a sense of attachment, a negative orientation towards another political party might have stronger implications on political behavior, particularly when this negative orientation stems from a negative experience (Medeiros and Noël, 2014).

Important to note on a conceptual basis, is that negative orientations towards other political parties might be a component of partisanship, in this paper we do not measure or interpret them as a type of 'negative identification' – as opposed to a positive identification (which is a sense of belonging to a certain group). We use a more limited but straightforward operationalization that provides an assessment of every potential party in the form of 'propensities to vote'.

This particular approach is connected to studies on voting behavior in multiparty setting focusing on the concept of 'consideration sets', or voting as a two-stage process (Bochsler and Sciarini, 2010; Oscarsson and Rosema, 2019; Wilson, 2008). Following this concept, voters do not

have a clear and stable preference for or identification with one particular party, but tend to consider a series of possible parties they might vote for (consideration stage). In a second step, the final decision is based on more short-term motives such as electoral campaigns (Oscarsson and Rosema, 2019). It is an approach to the decision-making process that acknowledges the particularities of multiparty systems, with a larger number of volatile, but within-block switchers (Dassonneville & Dejaeghere, 2014). Voters regularly switch parties, but if they do so, they tend to stay move within their own ideological block. A 'consideration set' can be seen as an individual block of parties in which one moves around. This obviously also implies that a number of parties are out of bounds, and this is where the relevance of the propensity to vote measure with 0–10 scores for every party becomes clear for this study.

We would like to point out, however, that a low score on the 0–10 propensity to vote score can be interpreted in two ways. A low score can be interpreted as a negative opinion towards a certain party, but it may also be just an indication that one is not considering to vote for the party at all, which is not necessarily the same. We will come back to the implications of this note when interpreting the final results in the discussion section.

2.2. The roots of negative partisanship: parental influence

If negative orientations towards political parties indeed deserve their place in the 'funnel of causality', we should devote more attention to their early development. As we know from the past decades of political socialization research, the early years of political development in one's life have a defining role for political attitude formation later in life. And as negative partisanship seems to be an important predictor of political behavior, we argue that it is also important to understand how this is developed early in life, more specifically in adolescence.

Adolescence is the transitional period in life in which questions of identity (Who am I? What am I doing? What do I believe?) foster a process of identity development, but also a process of social identity formation (Tanti et al., 2011). Changes in cognitive and social development are the central catalysts of change in social identity during adolescence. Studies analyzing the development of group identities and outgroup prejudice in adolescence show that the intergenerational transmission of group prejudice indeed seems to take place in adolescence (Meeusen and Dhont, 2015; O'Bryan et al., 2004; Sinclair et al., 2005). The cognitive development in this life phase is particularly relevant, as this also allows them to start orienting themselves in more complex domains, such as politics.

What we know from the past decades of political socialization research, is that early family experiences and political interaction are fundamental in the acquisition of political predispositions in adolescence. Particularly the direct transmission of party identities from parents to children is one of the most studied mechanisms in these political socialization studies (Glass et al., 1986: Jennings and Niemi, 1974, 1981). More recent empirical work still acknowledges the central role that early family experiences have in the development of partisan orientations among adolescents (Achen, 2002; Hooghe and Boonen, 2015; Jennings et al., 2009; Zuckerman et al., 2007), albeit with a stronger focus on the agency of the adolescent himself in these family socialization patterns (McDevitt and Chaffee, 2002; McDevitt, 2006; Ojeda and Hatemi, 2015).

Although the idea of partisanship being developed early in life within a small and stable family setting is a very traditional approach to early political development, the core idea still seems to hold in the current, strongly individualized political culture. New empirical insights have led us to a more qualified view on family socialization dynamics (that are no longer simply referred to as a top-down process of inheritance or imprinting), but no matter how rigid the new analytical models are, the basic conclusion still holds: parents remain a main source of inspiration for the development of partisanship among young

citizens, and children who acquire these predispositions early in life are generally more stable in their orientation (Jennings et al., 2009; McDevitt, 2006; Ojeda and Hatemi, 2015). We aim to contribute to our understanding of these socialization mechanisms, by analyzing the parent-child similarities in negative orientations.

A major difference with all the above mentioned empirical studies is that in the current study, we focus on the development of negative orientations, which requires a slightly different theoretical approach to social learning processes. The adolescents in our study will not be modelling a positive in-group identity, and we can expect that the cues will be communicated differently (Medeiros and Noël, 2014). For instance, the straightforward cue of 'In this family, we are Liberals' is easy to give, retain and internalize. Whereas 'We do not vote for party X' or 'We dislike party Y' is a different type of cue-giving that has not yet been studied in this manner. It might follow a similar logic, as 'not liking party X' could also be a desirable attitude, supported by parents, but we have no empirical assessment nor theoretical basis to assume that the social learning mechanisms work in the same way.

Intergenerational similarities in these negative orientations could also be interpreted as the other side of the coin of transmitting consideration sets from parents to children. It is plausible that parents consider a certain party block (all left-leaning parties) and transmit this set of options to their offspring (Percheron and Jennings, 1981; Ventura, 2001). Previous literature indeed showed that, particularly in European multiparty contexts, intergenerational similarities are driven by ideological blocks (Jennings, 1984; Rekker et al., 2019; Rico and Jennings, 2015). A parent-child match in negative orientations towards specific parties could in that case also be interpreted as a 'match of elimination' in parties that do not belong to a specific consideration set.

Negative opinions about parties can be an important part of political discussions in the family, and it is likely that this type of cue-giving occurs more frequently for polarizing parties with a provocative profile that are situated at the far ends of the political spectrum. The radical right party is of course an interesting example, as negative views towards this party are so widespread that it is often not socially desirable to express support for this party. The systematic underrepresentation of radical right voters in electoral surveys is a clear example in this respect (e.g. Aichholzer, Kritzinger, Wagner, & Zeglovits, 2014; Coffé & Voorpostel, 2010). Also within a family setting, we could expect that this party is often discussed in an explicitly negative way, and particularly for this and other polarizing parties we could expect higher levels of parent-child similarities as a result.

3. Hypotheses

Although this is the first study particularly focusing on the role of political learning in the family for the development of negative views towards political parties, we borrow from the theoretical insights presented above to formulate three basic hypotheses. In a first hypothesis, we underscore the importance of negative orientations and formulate the general expectation that parental socialization will be important for the development of both positive and negative views towards political parties.

H1. *Parent-child similarities occur in the expression of both positive and negative orientations towards political parties.*

Second, building further on social learning mechanisms and negative partisanship, we formulate the general expectation that in the first place, parental socialization is based on positive reinforcement (Jennings et al., 2009): parents who support one particular party, provide clear and observable cues related to this party, and positively reinforce their children if they follow their lead. This is the traditional social learning hypothesis of intergenerational transmission of party support, and following this idea, we expect to observe less parent-child similarity in negative than in positive orientations towards political parties.

Furthermore, there is an asymmetry in the development of positive and negative identification, according to the model of Medeiros and Noël (2014). Negative evaluations are "not fashioned by the same underlying forces as a positive party identification" (Medeiros and Noël, 2014, pp. 1040). The important social learning concept of group identity, for instance, strongly determines positive party identification but is only a weak or even non-significant determinant of negative party identification. Following both the model of positive reinforcement in social learning and the asymmetrical findings of Medeiros and Noël, we formulate the following hypothesis:

H2. *There is less parent-child similarity in negative than in positive orientations towards political parties.*

Following the rich empirical evidence from a long tradition of political socialization research, this seems to be a straightforward hypothesis. However, we should take into account the fact that negative orientations can be central political predispositions in many ways, also in terms of socialization and family influence. If family members have a strong and outspoken negative orientation towards a certain party (for instance because the party is polarizing or provocative to some), we can expect this to be salient and highly visible as well, particularly when they are based on earlier negative experiences.

In the fragmented party landscape that we are studying, we therefore expect that these negative experiences will more likely be associated with provocative or explicit messages – in turn mostly associated with polarizing parties at the far ends of the left-right axis (Garry, 2007). This expectation is again related to social learning and social identity theory described above. In order to see and reproduce behavior, modelling cues are essential, and the less complex the cues, the easier it becomes to observe and internalize them (Jennings et al., 2009). If parents communicate in a stable and straightforward way about their political preferences, children are more likely to perceive them correctly and internalize them consequently (Ojeda and Hatemi, 2015). Outspoken opinions are more clear and thus provide simpler and straightforward cues, therefore maximizing the odds of intergenerational similarity.

Therefore, we expect that 1) parent-child similarity in negative orientations is stronger when cues are outspokenly negative and that 2) the odds of outspokenly negative cues are higher for polarizing parties.

H3. *The parent-child similarities in negative orientations are stronger for polarizing parties at the far ends of the left-right axis.*

3.1. Our case: the Flemish party system in Belgium

As mentioned above, if we want to tackle this research puzzle empirically, it is important to be able to analyze different parties alongside one another, and not merely as opponents. Next to this, we obviously need a representative sample of parents and adolescent children expressing their evaluations of this list of parties.

The Flemish party system in the fragmented Belgian political landscape fits these requirements. Belgium has two separate party landscapes: a Flemish party system for the Dutch-speaking northern party of the country (and Brussels) and a Francophone party system for the French-speaking southern part of the country (and Brussels). We focus on the Flemish party system, one of the more diverse and fragmented political settings in Western Europe. Both on the regional (Flanders) as on the national level, broad coalition governments are the rule. They usually consist of three parties on the regional level and up to five parties on the national level, which makes that compromising is an essential part of the Belgian political culture. Over the past decades, a lot of new parties have successfully emerged in Flanders (such as the Green party *Groen*, the radical right *Vlaams Belang* and the New Flemish Alliance or *N-VA*) that position themselves in different ways on the different cross-cutting cleavages. This also implies that the party landscape cannot be reduced to a single ideological left-right dimension

(Deschouwer, 2012).

We can benefit from this situation, as we do not expect the same strong 'us versus them' dynamic as we can observe in more straightforward two-party systems (e.g. the US). As a result, we expect both multiple positive and multiple negative party evaluations to co-exist.

This way, we can overcome some measurement issues as well to some extent. In the US context it would for instance be very difficult to disentangle support for the Republicans from non-support towards the Democratic party (which comes first, what causes what). Furthermore, with the diverse set of parties present in the Flemish party landscape, we can connect the party type (single issue parties, polarizing parties, traditional parties …) to this empirical puzzle as well. An important downsize is the difficulties and limited availability of good measures for party identification that take into account the more refined operationalization that is necessary for multiparty settings (Bankert et al., 2017). This is also the case in the specific family socialization dataset that we are using for this study.

4. Data and methods

Next to the multiparty character, another important reason to select the Flemish case is a more pragmatic one, as a unique data gathering project in 2012 and 2013 (the Parent-Child Socialization Study) was conducted among a representative sample of adolescents and their parents living in this region. The Parent-Child Socialization Study is a two-wave panel study focused on political socialization conducted among more than 3000 Flemish adolescents and both their parents. In the first wave (2012) a sample of 3426 14-to 15-year old adolescents was interviewed using a written self-administered questionnaire in a stratified random sample of 61 Dutch language schools. All adolescents received a similar questionnaire for both their parents which could be completed at home. In 60.8% of all cases, both parents completed the survey and for 72.7% of the adolescents at least one parent returned a completed questionnaire. Looking at gender and educational level, the sample resembles the distribution in the population.

In the second wave of data gathering (2013), 3598 16-year old adolescents participated. In total, 80.9 percent of the adolescents who participated in 2012 also participated in the 2013 wave. Furthermore, 1943 parent-dyads (or 54.0%) replied with a filled-out questionnaire. For 67,6% of the adolescents, at least one parent returned a completed questionnaire in Wave 2.

Before we discuss the analyses, it is essential to clarify and defend the choice for our main independent and dependent variable: the propensity to vote, as this variable will serve as a proxy for positive and negative views on political parties.

4.1. Main variable: propensity to vote (PTV)

Our operationalization is connect to the concept of 'consideration sets' in electoral research in multiparty settings, often measured with a propensity to vote' for all (Oscarsson and Rosema, 2019; van der Eijk et al., 2006). Traditionally, the propensity to vote for a certain party is measured on a 0 to 10 scale, which was also the case in the Parent-Child Socialization study: '*On a scale ranging from 0 to 10, could you indicate how likely you are ever to vote for the following parties*'. All adolescent and adult respondents were asked to fill out this question for all regional Flemish parties. It is important to note that this variable is designed to express an intention ever to *vote* for a certain party, and in that sense does not literally capture whether one supports or does not support the party's policies as a whole. It is possible that, for instance for strategic reasons, respondents express that they are likely to vote for a party, without having a positive attitude towards this party, although both will of course be strongly related.

Studies have shown a number of important empirical advantages of using the propensity to vote measure. Most importantly, it provides a broader insight in decision-making process of voting, particularly in

Table 1
Descriptive statistics propensity to vote adolescents, mothers and fathers in the 2012 sample.
Source: Parent-Child Socialization Study (PCSS) 2012.

	Adolescents			Mothers			Fathers		
	N	Mean.	SD.	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
CD&V (Christian democrats)	3228	5.10	2.84	2102	4.89	3.25	1960	4.71	3.30
Groen (Green party)	3223	4.47	2.96	2109	4.49	3.22	1961	3.67	3.15
N-VA (New Flemish Alliance)	3209	5.38	2.95	2094	5.67	3.47	1961	6.08	3.49
Open VLD (Liberal party)	3201	4.61	2.59	2089	4.63	3.09	1948	4.63	3.25
Sp.a (Socialist party)	3172	4.32	2.63	2073	3.90	3.03	1939	3.48	3.02
Vlaams Belang (Radical right)	3230	4.01	3.15	2113	2.42	3.20	1955	2.49	3.24

multiparty systems where voters tend to have a larger 'consideration set' of possible parties to vote for (Bochsler and Sciarini, 2010; Oscarsson and Rosema, 2019; van der Eijk et al., 2006). Furthermore – and this is obviously essential for our analysis – this approach also allows us to take into account the important negative evaluations.

It is obvious that this 0-10 scale is a useful variable for our analysis, but it has two additional empirical advantages. First, it provides information for all parties for every respondent, minimizing the number of missing data in the analyses. Second, as this variable ranges from 0 to 10, it has a very convenient neutral reference category (5).[1]

The propensity to vote will serve as the independent variable (parental propensities) and as the dependent variable (adolescents' propensities) in our analyses. We use a standard OLS regression (dependent variable 0–10), but to disentangle positive from negative evaluations in the independent variables, we recode the parental independent variable in five categories: 0–2: strong negative evaluation of party X; 3–4: weak negative evaluation of party X; 5:neutral evaluation of party X; 6–7: weak positive evaluation of party X; 8–10: strong positive evaluation of party X. As mentioned earlier, we do need to be cautious with this interpretation to some extent. For now, we interpret a low PTV score as a negative evaluation of party X, but there is a possibility that a 0–4 score is just indication that one is not considering to vote for the party, without holding a negative opinion about it.

We use the voting propensities for the six main Flemish parties, presented in the overview in Table 1 below. For every party in the 2012 wave, we have about 3200 adolescent scores, 2100 mother scores and 1900 father scores. Two parties that were available in the data are not included in the analyses: fig (formerly known as List Dedecker) and PvdA (the radical leftist party), because of the very limited amount of respondents who had a party preference for these parties (LDD: 0,6 percent, PvdA: 1.1 percent in the 2012 wave). Furthermore, at the time of the data gathering, LDD's presence in the political landscape had already strongly diminished, as they for instance only participated in 50 out of 308 constituencies in the local elections. PvdA at that time had no elected officials in the Flemish parliament and was therefore also too marginally present in the Flemish political landscape to be included in this type of comparative analysis in which a minimum level of name *recognition* is paramount for the validity of the results.

We would like to point out two specific elements related to the propensity to vote measures in this dataset. The mean scores for the propensity to vote variables (presented in Appendix 1) differ

structurally for certain groups. Boys (Mean: 4.55, SD: 1.83) tend to rate all parties significantly lower (p < .001) than girls (Mean: 4.78, SD: 4.55). SES also seems to play a role, as adolescents in general education rate all parties significantly higher (Mean: 5.02, SD: 1.48) than adolescents in technical (Mean: 4.69, SD: 1.70) and vocational (Mean: 3.80, SD: 2.11) education. Finally, adolescents also rate all parties slightly higher (Mean: 4.66, SD: 1.76) than mothers (Mean: 4.35, SD:1.51) and fathers (Mean: 4.17, SD: 1.53). This higher overall score of adolescents can be linked to the fact that adolescents also tend to use the middle – neutral or indifferent – option more than adults (see Table 2). We control for these variables in the final regression models presented in the next section.

Furthermore, we would like to stress that a positive propensity to vote for one party, does not imply a negative propensity to vote for all other parties. On the contrary, the majority of respondents evaluate more than one party positively. This is the case for 51% of the adolescents, 61% of the mothers and 61% of the fathers. This qualification is important for the validity of our analyses, and again illustrates the usefulness of a multiparty setting as a case study, as supporting party A does not automatically imply a negative evaluation of all other parties. Consequently, negative orientations can be effectively operationalized as a separate and specific indicator.

In Table 2, we present the full overview of the recoded propensity to vote scores for adolescents, mothers and fathers. These descriptives provide some first insights in the distribution of the positive, neutral and negative scores of our respondents. First, the parties with the largest number of explicit non-supporters seem to be those on the far ends of the political spectrum. *Vlaams Belang* on the far right is obviously the clearest example, with 36% of the adolescents, 64% of the mothers and 63% of the fathers in the sample indicating they would never vote for this party. However, also *Groen*, and to a lesser extent the *Sp.a* on the left seem to be somewhat polarizing in our sample. In the father subsample, for instance, 42% of the respondents indicates they will never vote for *Groen*, and 44% indicates they will never vote for *Sp.a.*

A second element that comes to the forefront in Table 2, is that the adolescents are clearly less outspoken in their voting propensities, which is illustrated by the larger group of 'neutral' (5) scores for every party. The adult respondents generally express a more explicit positive or negative score for these parties.

4.2. Control variables

Apart from the voting propensities, we include three traditional control variables that are found to influence voting behavior in general (cfr. supra): gender, socioeconomic status and ideology. For *gender*, the reference category is male (female = 1). We use the *educational level* of the adolescent as an indicator for socioeconomic status. The Flemish school system is divided in clearly distinguished educational tracks: general education, technical education, vocational education and a very small track of artistic education. The pupils who are enrolled in the general education are typically being prepared for higher (university) education. General education is theory-oriented, and further academic

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[1] A score of 5 can be interpreted in two ways. 1) It is a neutral answer (comparable to a score of 5 on the left-right identification scale) for respondents who do not have outspoken positive or negative views towards the party. This is plausible, as the survey did not include an explicit 'no opinion' or 'neutral' box next to the scale. 2) It is a very careful consideration for respondents who might consider ever to vote for the party. This is also possible, but less plausible when we look at the descriptive statistics of the PTV scales. The distribution is for instance comparable to that of the left-right identification variable, which did include an explicit 'neutral' option for a score of 5.

Table 2
Descriptive statistics propensity to vote adolescents, mothers and fathers - recoded.
Source: Parent-Child Socialization Study (2012). Entries are percentages.

	Very negative score (0–2)	Negative score (3–4)	Neutral (5)	Positive score (6–7)	Very positive score (8–10)
Adolescents					
CD&V (Christian democrats)	19.2	10.4	29.9	18.3	22.2
Groen (Green party)	28.4	11.4	26.8	16.5	16.9
N-VA (New Flemish Alliance)	18.4	8.9	29.9	19.2	23.6
Open VLD (Liberal party)	21.0	12.6	33.5	22.2	10.7
Sp.a (Socialist party)	25.0	14.2	32.8	18.4	9.6
Vlaams Belang (Radical Right)	36.1	9.8	24.0	15.5	14.6
Mothers					
CD&V (Christian democrats)	27.7	11.0	18.7	17.7	24.9
Groen (Green party)	31.8	13.4	16.5	17.7	20.6
N-VA (New Flemish Alliance)	23.0	10.3	12.6	15.2	38.9
Open VLD (Liberal party)	28.2	14.9	19.1	17.6	20.2
Sp.a (Socialist party)	36.2	17.4	17.7	14.7	14.0
Vlaams Belang (Radical Right)	64.2	8.3	9.4	6.6	11.5
Fathers					
CD&V (Christian democrats)	30.2	12.3	15.0	19.0	23.5
Groen (Green party)	41.9	15.2	14.7	14.6	13.6
N-VA (New Flemish Alliance)	20.9	7.4	11.5	15.5	44.7
Open VLD (Liberal party)	29.9	13.9	16.0	16.9	23.3
Sp.a (Socialist party)	43.6	15.6	15.4	13.9	11.5
Vlaams Belang (Radical Right)	63.0	9.4	8.1	8.2	11.3

training is considered as a main goal for this educational track. The technical and artistic educational tracks combine practical skills and general education. The vocational educational track, finally, prepares pupils for a job which requires specific practical skills (Van Houtte, 2004).

Finally, we included *left-right orientation* as a general measure of ideology. The measure will never truly tap the wide range of social and political preferences that determines an adolescent's ideological orientation, but we include this merely as a basic proxy for ideological orientation. Particularly in the Flemish party landscape with cross-cutting cleavages across party lines, it is found to be difficult to interpret in a one-dimensional manner (Deschouwer, 2012). This is even more so for the adolescents in the sample, who had difficulties matching left-right orientation with clear leftist or rightist issues (measured in two additional political knowledge questions). That is way we should be rather cautious in interpreting the left-right orientation among the adolescent sub sample as a full measure of ideological orientation, as a correct interpretation is also related with a certain level of political sophistication. For the current analysis, we therefore only interpret it as a general proxy for ideology.

It is still the broadest and most frequently employed abstraction of one's political ideology and we argue that it can therefore effectively fulfill the function for which we use it (Inglehart, 1990; Knutsen, 1998).

5. Analyses

5.1. Explorative analyses

In a first part of the analyses, we explore the relation between parental propensity to vote scores and adolescent propensity to vote scores in a descriptive way. In Table 3, we present a series of crosstabs in which we show the distribution of the adolescent propensity to vote scores in the five different scenarios of very negative, negative, neutral, positive and very positive scores.

Obviously, we expect to observe that in the scenario of high PTV scores among parents, the distribution of the adolescent PTVs will be more concentrated towards the support-side as well, compared to the situation in which the parent has a neutral orientation. We have seen this result quite a lot in explorations of parent-child similarities in voting behavior (Zuckerman et al., 2007), so we expect to replicate this

with our data. What has not been explored so far, however, is what the other end of this distribution looks like. Similar studies on this topic only have two scenarios: either the parent votes for the party, or s/he does not, and both are compared to one another. We add another dimension to this, as we can include negative orientations towards a party as well. Following the same logic, if there is a relation between a negative parental orientation and a negative orientation among the adolescents, we would expect to see a distribution of the propensity to vote measure that is more concentrated to the left of the scale (0–4) compared to the scenario in which the parent is neutral towards the party.

A few elements stand out in this first overview. First, the distribution of the propensity to vote scale clearly differs in both scenarios of positive and negative parental PTV scores from the scenario in which the parents have a neutral evaluation. One of the clearest trends in this series of crosstabs is that when parents express a negative evaluation of a party, adolescents tend to have a very explicit negative evaluation of this party as well. This is particularly the case for *Vlaams Belang* and *Groen*: if the mother or father has a low PTV score for this party, the adolescent scores clearly follow the same trend. For instance, if a mother has a low PTV score for the Green party, 37.8% of the adolescents expresses the same 0–2 score, and 14.7% expresses a more moderately negative 3–4 score. Compared to the situation in which the mother has a neutral score, only 24.0% of the adolescents expresses a clear negative orientation towards this party. For the radical right party, the trend is even more outspoken. If the mother has a low (0–2) PTV score, 42.3% of the adolescents have the same low score, whereas 11.2% express a more moderately negative 3–4 score. In the situation in which the mother has a neutral score, only 20.9% of the adolescents score a low 0–2 PTV score for this party.

When we compare these percentages to the positive scores on the right-hand side of the cross-tabs, some interesting trends appear as well. In general, we can observe that if parents support a party, adolescents are also more inclined to do so, as expected. However, the positive scores among the adolescents are more spread out than the negative ones. On the left-hand side, the negative peaks are generally higher than the more mildly negative 3–4 PTV scores. On the right-hand side, this is not always the case, and the adolescents tend to express their support towards a party in a more moderate way. Next, parental positive scores seem to match more strongly with adolescent positive scores than the negative scores. This is the case for most parties, although the

Table 3

Crosstabs showing the relation between parent and child propensity to vote scores (row percentages).

Source: PCSS 2012. Entries are row percentages.

		Adolescent PTV-scores							Adolescent PTV-scores				
		0–2	3–4	5	6–7	8–10	N		0–2	3–4	5	6–7	8–10	N
		−	-	+/−	+	+ +			−	-	+/−	+	+ +	
CD&V (Christian Democrats)														
0–2	Mother	**26.2**	13.7	27.7	15.4	17.0	546	Father	**24.7**	12.9	30.5	14.9	17.0	558
3–4		21.8	**14.5**	31.4	15.5	14.1	220		15.2	**12.2**	35.7	19.1	17.8	230
5		14.1	11.7	**35.0**	20.2	19.1	377		16.7	12.5	**30.2**	22.1	18.5	281
6–7		8.2	5.1	22.5	**40.8**	23.3	510		8.4	6.7	23.3	**38.4**	23.1	450
8–10		11.4	9.7	29.1	22.7	**27.1**	361		10.0	8.6	31.1	26.9	**23.3**	360
Groen (Green party)														
0–2	Mother	**37.8**	14.7	24.8	9.6	13.0	645	Father	**36.7**	14.3	25.1	10.8	13.1	785
3–4		31.0	**13.6**	26.7	13.6	15.1	258		22.6	**10.2**	30.7	14.5	21.9	283
5		24.0	11.6	**30.3**	16.6	17.5	337		20.6	11.0	**34.2**	17.1	17.1	281
6–7		12.7	6.2	23.0	**35.7**	22.3	417		12.0	8.0	20.3	**39.0**	20.7	251
8–10		19.8	11.5	26.8	18.2	**23.7**	358		19.6	11.6	25.0	20.7	**23.2**	276
N-VA (New Flemish Alliance)														
0–2	Mother	**27.5**	11.8	27.5	14.6	18.7	459	Father	**30.0**	11.0	28.5	12.0	18.5	383
3–4		17.7	**10.3**	34.0	19.2	18.7	203		14.0	**11.8**	33.8	16.2	24.3	136
5		15.9	8.3	**29.0**	21.0	25.8	252		16.1	10.4	**27.0**	25.1	21.3	211
6–7		8.1	5.9	22.2	**44.5**	19.3	779		8.2	5.8	24.1	**42.1**	19.8	843
8–10		10.2	8.3	27.4	28.1	**26.1**	303		14.6	8.5	27.1	25.1	**24.7**	295
Open VLD (Liberal party)														
0–2	Mother	**25.8**	13.8	30.3	5.2	24.9	558	Father	**23.2**	14.4	35.9	6.1	20.4	543
3–4		17.3	**15.6**	39.8	9.2	18.0	294		17.3	**12.3**	40.4	6.5	23.5	260
5		17.4	14.5	**34.2**	8.5	25.4	386		20.3	13.2	**30.8**	7.1	28.5	295
6–7		10.0	10.7	27.4	**23.9**	28.1	402		8.6	10.7	29.2	**23.2**	28.3	431
8–10		13.8	11.2	35.0	10.3	**29.8**	349		14.8	12.0	32.7	12.0	**28.4**	324
Sp.a (Socialist party)														
0–2	Mother	**29.4**	16.2	30.4	5.6	18.3	714	Father	**28.2**	16.6	31.7	5.5	18.1	802
3–4		23.0	**15.9**	34.2	8.6	18.3	339		22.1	**14.6**	36.7	8.9	17.8	281
5		19.9	16.2	**38.6**	6.0	19.3	352		20.6	11.7	**35.8**	7.4	24.5	280
6–7		16.2	10.7	28.8	**24.0**	20.3	271		13.3	9.5	29.4	**26.5**	21.3	211
8–10		16.7	14.9	36.1	9.7	**22.6**	288		15.2	15.2	37.7	11.3	**20.6**	257
Vlaams Belang (Radical Right party)														
0–2	Mother	**42.3**	11.2	22.3	10.2	14.0	1300	Father	**41.6**	11.1	23.0	9.5	14.9	1176
3–4		26.5	**11.8**	27.6	11.2	22.9	170		23.6	**11.8**	30.3	16.9	17.4	178
5		20.9	9.9	**27.7**	19.9	21.5	191		23.4	16.9	**26.6**	14.9	18.2	154
6–7		11.5	11.9	22.5	**32.6**	21.6	227		17.9	5.3	24.2	**35.3**	17.4	207
8–10		17.4	8.3	32.6	21.2	**20.5**	132		21.2	9.0	27.6	20.5	**21.8**	156

radical right party and the Green party are again interesting exceptions in this respect. For these parties, the parent-child similarities in low scores seem to be stronger than the similarities in support.

To visualize these trends somewhat clearer, we have plotted the adolescents' distribution in a series of figures presented in Fig. 1. In this table, we show how the full adolescent distribution of the propensity to vote scale looks like in three separate scenario's: the distribution in the case of positive parental score (propensity to vote > 5), in the case of a negative parental score, (propensity to vote < 5) and the scenario in which the parent is neutral (propensity to vote = 5). This visualization is helpful, as it gives us more information on the spread of the adolescent scores from 0 to 10.

One element that immediately pops up in these figures are the differences between the pronounced negative (peaks of 0-scores) and the wider spread of the positive scores. The distributions for the Flemish nationalist party are illustrative in this respect: in the scenario of parental support, the adolescents express their support as well, but this is spread out on the scale between 6 (modest support) to 10 (strong support). In the scenario of negative parental scores, the adolescents express their negative evaluation quite firmly, with again a strong peak of zero scores.

A second clear trend is that parent-child similarities are clearly not one-to-one relations. If we for instance look at the Liberal and Socialist party, we can see that there is only a very moderate support for these parties among the adolescents, no matter whether parents support this party or not.

Third, *Vlaams Belang* and *Groen* stand out again, because of the strong peaks in 0-scores. Particularly when parents do not tend to vote for this party this party, adolescents tend to have a very pronounced negative orientation towards these parties.

Finally, it should be noted that the clearest trend in all these figures, is that the majority of the adolescents remains 'neutral' towards the political parties, no matter what the evaluation of the parents is. This is particularly the case for the mainstream parties at the center of the political spectrum (Christian democrats, Liberals and Socialists), and to a lesser extent for parties at the far ends (Green party and radical right party). We are not particularly concerned about these peaks in neutral scores. They only indicate that for every party, 26 to 33 percent of the adolescents have a neutral orientation. These 15-year-olds are obviously still developing their orientations towards these different political parties in the complex Flemish party landscape, and it is not surprising that they do not have an outspoken evaluation of every different party at the same time.

5.2. Regression models

In a next analytical step, we aim to test the relations between parents and children with a series of regression models. We ran six different linear regression models, for all six major parties. The dependent variable is the adolescent 0–10 propensity to vote scale. The independent variables are the recoded propensity to vote variables for the mothers and fathers in the sample, ranging from very negative scores

Note: graphs show a distribution of adolescent ptv scores for three categories of parental scores: positive scores (6-10), neutral scores (5) and negative scores (0-4). M=Mother, F=Father.

Fig. 1. Adolescent propensity to vote (PTV) distributions by positive, negative or neutral parental scores.

(0-2), negative scores (3–4), positive scores (6–7) and very positive scores (8–10). To differentiate between the effects of positive and negative scores, 'neutral' (5) serves as the reference category in these analyses.

The results are presented in Table 4 below, and expose some new insights concerning our hypotheses. First of all, as could be expected from the descriptive results presented above, we observe significant effects of the parental variables on the adolescent propensity to vote scores, not only for positive, but also for negative scores. Low parental PTV scores negatively affect the propensity to vote among adolescents significantly. This is the case for all parties, except for the *Open VLD*, a very small party in the adolescent sample (5,6%). Furthermore, the positive relation between positive parental scores and adolescents' PTV-scores seems to equal the negative relation between parental support and adolescents' PTV-scores for most parties, a result that contradicts our second hypothesis. In most cases, parental evaluations need to be clear and outspoken in order to have an effect, as mostly the very

positive and very negative scores significantly affects adolescents' PTV-scores.

There are some striking party-specific differences worth mentioning. The strongest effect of negative party evaluations is observed for the radical right party, where strong negative evaluations among parents (more particularly mothers) strongly influence the negative evaluations of adolescents. On the other hand, fathers that support this party seem to influence their children quite strongly, as we also observe a strong positive effect in this direction. We should note, however, that the regression results for the radical right party should be interpreted with caution, as the distribution of the parental responses is strongly skewed to the left (50.3% of the mothers and 50.5% of the fathers indicate never to vote for this party, with a score of 0 on the propensity to vote scale).

Apart from these peculiar radical right results, the results for the other parties seem to indicate that socialization mechanisms indeed also apply for negative evaluations as well, both for mainstream parties

Table 4
Linear regression models assessing the relation between parental adolescents' propensity to vote scores.
Source: Parent-Child Socialization Study 2012. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors (SE). *:p < .05; **:p < .01; ***:p < .001

	Groen	Vlaams Belang	CD&V	N-VA	Open VLD	Sp.a
	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)
(Constant)	4.289*** (.431)	3.115*** (.511)	3.112*** (.399)	3.425*** (.428)	2.956*** (.377)	4.609*** (.393)
PTV Mother (neutral = ref.)						
Mother 0–2 (very negative)	-.924*** (.207)	− 1.495*** (.259)	-.580** (.200)	-.659** (.226)	-.236ns (.180)	-.321ns (.184)
Mother 3–4 (negative)	-.608* (.253)	-.892** (.340)	-.619* (.245)	-.071ns (.270)	-.081ns (.206)	.054ns (.211)
Mother 6–7 (positive)	-.014ns (.234)	.145ns (.369)	.100ns (.214)	.290ns (.244)	.153ns (.198)	.291ns (.222)
Mother 8–10 (very positive)	.804*** (.236)	.508ns (.326)	.641** (.210)	.789*** (.211)	.621** (.201)	.890*** (.234)
PTV Father (neutral = ref.)						
Father 0–2 (very negative)	-.860*** (.210)	-.183ns (.279)	-.443* (.209)	− 759** (.247)	-.244ns (.191)	-.649** (.190)
Father 3–4 (negative)	.023ns (.248)	.550ns (.340)	-.061 (.248)	-.142ns (.306)	.137 (.219)	-.412ns (.226)
Father 6–7 (positive)	.283ns (.254)	.197ns (.355)	.421ns (.223)	.080ns (.257)	.203 (.207)	.056ns (.231)
Father 8–10 (very positive)	.892** (.267)	1.279*** (.339)	.702** (.223)	.580* (.227)	.738*** (.206)	.420ns (.256)
Education (vocational = ref.)						
General education	-.199ns (.223)	.340ns (.234)	.769*** (.207)	.785*** (.209)	.814*** (.193)	.418* (.200)
Technical education	-.236ns (.234)	.578ns (.244)	.683** (.217)	.347ns (.220)	.432* (.202)	.159ns (.213)
Gender (girl = 1)	.734*** (.140)	-.271ns (.146)	.512*** (.130)	-.350** (.130)	.118ns (.121)	.300* (.213)
Left-right identification	-.018ns (.043)	.369*** (.044)	.161*** (.040)	.368*** (.040)	.187*** (.037)	-.112** (.039)
N	1565	1571	1566	1556	1541	1.505
R^2	.148	.168	.132	.198	.098	.081

such as the Christian democrats and for parties with an outspoken leftist (Green party) or rightist (Flemish nationalist party) profile.[2]

6. Discussion

The final results presented above lead us to a first general conclusion: negative orientations towards political parties are shaped in adolescence, at least to some extent by parental influence. Intergenerational similarity is not only observed in party support – as could be expected from earlier research – but can also be observed, to a similar extent, for (outspoken) negative orientations. As mentioned above, this is our main interpretation of the results, based on the literature on negative partisanship, but not necessarily the only possible one. As we are limited to using PTV scores, it is also possible that what we are observing is the socialization of consideration sets: parents may for instance consider all leftist parties and not consider any rightist party, and transmit this configuration to their children. This is a more toned-down interpretation of the results, and looking at the results for center parties such as CD&V, for instance, it might also be a plausible one. For CD&V, one third of the parents in the sample score 0–2 on their PTV. It is plausible that we are not observing negative orientations here, but just an outspoken tendency not to consider this party. For the more polarizing *Vlaams Belang,* it seems more plausible that the 0–2 scores can be interpreted as negative orientations. Truly disentangling the more refined nature of negative evaluations or identification in such an analysis might be a promising avenue for future research.

Regardless of the interpretation, however, (very) low PTV scores seem to follow the same classic logic of parental socialization and political learning as positive orientations. This supports the initial assumption that within the household, adolescents learn about the 'good ones' and the 'bad ones' of the political world. The results differ to some

extent for the different parties that were analyzed. The intergenerational similarities in low PTV scores were more outspoken for two particular parties, namely *Vlaams Belang,* and to a lesser extent *Groen.* But in general, this logic does not only apply for polarizing parties, but also for more mainstream established parties, such as the Christian democrats (see alternative interpretation above).

These findings have some implications for the study of political learning in the family in general. Negative orientations are relevant, as they seem to be a part of family discussions and transfer from one generation to the next. The evaluation of party X among adolescents is significantly more negative in families where parents have a negative preference towards this party, than in families where parents have a neutral preference towards this party. Parents seem to reinforce more than party support alone in the political learning process, and we can expect that also a communication process focused on which parties definitely *not* to support ("In this family, we do not vote for party X″) takes place within the family as well. This is of course particularly relevant in multiparty settings. If adolescents indeed develop outspoken negative orientations towards particular parties, they are left with a smaller 'consideration set' of potential parties when they enter the political world themselves.

More generally, the findings in this paper again underscore the importance of including the 'negative side' of party evaluations in electoral analyses. We now know that this is a preference developed early in life, and we already knew from previous literature that a strong tendency not to support a specific party can affect political behavior in many ways. Particularly in complex multiparty settings, acknowledging this as a relevant attitude can provide new insights in the study of political behavior and especially in the development of consideration sets.

The main purpose of this paper was to explore the development of negative orientations towards political parties within the household, and the explorative character of the analyses also causes a number of limitations. To truly understand the nature of the relation between parents and children, one would need to assess this in a more qualitative way, as we do not have any information on the discussion patterns that have fostered these intergenerational similarities. Furthermore, the models presented in this paper are rather limited, as they do not include a full party ID scale nor policy preferences, or other substantive reasons that could lead to a negative evaluation of a certain party. In terms of operationalization, using voting propensities might be a logical choice, but it also limits the possibilities of truly extending these results to

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[2] In an additional set of multinomial logistic regression models, reported in Appendix 2, we explored the stability of both support and non-support among the adolescents (we coded stability as having a stable negative, < 5, or stable positive, > 5, propensity to vote score in both waves 2012–2013, compared to all other scenarios). For all six parties, lower paternal and maternal scores on the propensity to vote scales increase the likelihood of negative evaluations among adolescents. This indicates that if an adolescent develops a negative evaluation towards a certain party within his family surroundings, s/he is more likely to stick with this negative evaluation in the next year. This mechanism also applies for party support, as could be expected from earlier research (Jennings et al., 2009).

conclusions on party identification, as this was not measured as such. On that note, the possibilities to generalize these findings to contexts in which partisanship is indeed an important and relevant aspect of one's social identity (such as the United States) remain limited.

The analyses in this paper should therefore be seen as an additional step in the exploration of the role of negative evaluations to understand political behavior. We hope that this still relatively new focus in partisanship literature will be developed further over the next years, as we believe that it truly can provide an added value to the classic 'funnel of causality'.

Acknowledgement

Appendix 1. Mean propensity to vote scores

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Mothers	1980	0	10	4.35	1.51
Fathers	1891	0	10	4.17	1.53
Adolescents (tot.)	3076	0	10	4.66	1.76
Boys	1679	0	10	4.55†	1.83
Girls	1396	0	10	4.78	1.67
General education	1410	0	10	5.02°	1.48
Technical education	1033	0	10	4.69°	1.70
Vocational education	630	0	10	3.80°	2.11

Note: †: T-test difference girls and boys: $t = -3.59$*** (mean difference = -0.228).

°: Games-Howell post hoc ANOVA difference test: mean difference general – technical education: 0.323***, mean difference technical – vocational education: 0.911***, mean difference general – vocational education: 1.235***.

Appendix 2. Multinomial regression models predicting stable support and stable non-support among adolescents

	Christian democratic party		Green party		Flemish nationalist party		Liberal party		Socialist party		Radical right party	
	Stable non-support	Stable support	Stable non-support	Stable support	Stable non-support	Stable support	Stable non-support	Stable support	Stable non-support	Stable support	Stable non-support	Stable support
	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)
(intercept)	-.064ns (.406)	−4.541 (.448)	-.434ns (.383)	−2.482*** (.407)	1.017* (.422)	−2.838*** (.394)	-.180ns (.385)	−3.276*** (.451)	-.427ns (.378)	−2.583*** (.490)	.271ns (.323)	−2.532*-** (.449)
PTV Parents (0–10)												
Propensity to vote mother	-.049ns (.029)	.156*** (.023)	-.078** (.025)	.163*** (.025)	-.109*** (.028)	.117*** (.020)	-.059* (.028)	.101*** (.026)	-.094*** (.024)	.074* (.030)	-.128*** (.025)	.099*** (.024)
Propensity to vote father	-.098** (.029)	.090*** (.023)	-.133*** (.025)	.076** (.023)	-.125*** (.026)	.108*** (.021)	-.044ns (.026)	.109*** (.025)	-.100*** (.025)	.127*** (.030)	-.066** (.023)	.045ns (.024)
Education (vocational = ref.)												
General education	.135ns (.227)	1.480*** (.290)	.641** (.216)	.483* (.234)	.422ns (.249)	1.297*** (.235)	-.142ns (.220)	.873** (.272)	.411ns (.216)	.815*** (.294)	.697** (.203)	.755** (.256)
Technical education	-.170ns (.242)	1.194*** (.299)	.338ns (.225)	.083ns (.252)	-.017ns (.271)	.635** (.245)	-.156ns (.228)	.262ns (.289)	.386ns (.225)	.136ns (.322)	.071ns (.217)	.412ns (.260)
Gender (girl = 1)	-.490** (.165)	.245* (.126)	-.500*** (.134)	.141ns (.138)	-.321ns (.177)	-.693*** (.123)	-.197ns (.152)	-.321* (.141)	-.569*** (.133)	-.260ns (.167)	-.194ns (.121)	-.759*** (.157)
Left-right identification	-.044ns (.047)	.147*** (.041)	.089* (.042)	-.045ns (.042)	-.251*** (.053)	.176*** (.040)	-.098* (.045)	.148** (.044)	.079* (.040)	-.029ns (.050)	-.110** (.038)	.258*** (.047)
N	1593		1597		1592		1576		1564		1604	
Nagelkerke R^2	.187		.177		.262		.124		.121		.177	

Source: Parent-Child Socialization Study (2012–2013).

Note: Entries are unstandardized multinomial logistic regression coefficients (B) and standard errors (SE). *:$p < .05$; **:$p < .01$; ***:$p < .001$. The reference category for all models contains all other possibilities (stable neutral orientation, switches in party support).

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