What makes a theory of consciousness unscientific?

Karen Yan, Martijn E. Wokke, Michal Wierzchon, Thalia Wheatley, Josh Weisberg, Taylor Webb, Sebastian Watzl, Jonas Vibell, Peter U. Tse, Frank Tong, Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel, Timo Stein, Hugo Spiers, David Soto, Guillermo Solovey, Barry C. Smith, Heleen A. Slagter, Juha Silvanto, Joshua Shepherd, Aaron R. SeitzRyan B. Scott, D. Samuel Schwarzkopf, Aaron Schurger, Daniela Schiller, Adina Roskies, Dario L. Ringach, Geraint Rees, Dobromir Rahnev, Rosanne L. Rademaker, Ian Phillips, Megan A.K. Peters, Franco Pestilli, David Pereplyotchik, Adrian M. Owen, Charles C.F. Or, Brian Odegaard, Myrto Mylopoulos, Jorge Morales, Robert M. Mok, Dean Mobbs, Partha P. Mitra, Kenneth D. Miller, Matthias Michel, Janet Metcalfe, Julio Martinez-Trujillo, Maro G. Machizawa, Ka Yuet Liu, Ying Tung Lin, Matthew D. Lieberman, Beatrice de Gelder, IIT-Concerned

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/Letter to the editorAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Theories of consciousness have a long and controversial history. One well-known proposal — integrated information theory — has recently been labeled as ‘pseudoscience’, which has caused a heated open debate. Here we discuss the case and argue that the theory is indeed unscientific because its core claims are untestable even in principle.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)689-693
Number of pages5
JournalNature Neuroscience
Volume28
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2025

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