Abstract
In his text "A Hedgehog's Unity of Value," Joseph Raz presents two readings on Ronald Dworkin's thesis on the unit of value, paying particular attention to the content of the work "Justice for Hedgehogs." Raz's goal is to experiment with plausible conclusions on Dworkin's ideas, testing how valid they are and, through this experimentation, reach conclusions regarding the moral epistemology of values and the structure that unifies them.
However, Raz recognizes that the two readings he performs are not compatible with each other. In the first of these perspectives, Raz points out that the values would be "object-dependent truths" (ODT). Truths about value would be independent of people's views of what values exist; the constitution of a value would depend only on other values or propositions about values. On the other hand, in his second interpretation, Raz rejects the reading of values as ODT, pointing out that these are truths dependent on the individual's interpretive process. I will call this perspective values as "interpretive-dependent truths" (IDT).
Starting from Dworkin's work, he argues that the reading of values as ODT is not coherent with his thesis because it disregards the moral side of the epistemology of values (morally integrated epistemology) and ignores that the truth on values is achieved through the interpretive method used for its understanding, so that the reasoning used is, in itself, an essential part of the truth about values.
To this end, I first describe the two readings made by Raz, both that of values as ODT (Section "1.1") and that of values as interpretative truths (Section "1.2"). Next, I consider the inconsistencies of the ODT perspective in light of the interpretive nature of the values (Section "2"); I analyze the morally integrated epistemology of the values (Section "2.1") and, elaborating on the second reading offered by Raz, I defend the interpretive dependence of the values (Section "2.2").
However, Raz recognizes that the two readings he performs are not compatible with each other. In the first of these perspectives, Raz points out that the values would be "object-dependent truths" (ODT). Truths about value would be independent of people's views of what values exist; the constitution of a value would depend only on other values or propositions about values. On the other hand, in his second interpretation, Raz rejects the reading of values as ODT, pointing out that these are truths dependent on the individual's interpretive process. I will call this perspective values as "interpretive-dependent truths" (IDT).
Starting from Dworkin's work, he argues that the reading of values as ODT is not coherent with his thesis because it disregards the moral side of the epistemology of values (morally integrated epistemology) and ignores that the truth on values is achieved through the interpretive method used for its understanding, so that the reasoning used is, in itself, an essential part of the truth about values.
To this end, I first describe the two readings made by Raz, both that of values as ODT (Section "1.1") and that of values as interpretative truths (Section "1.2"). Next, I consider the inconsistencies of the ODT perspective in light of the interpretive nature of the values (Section "2"); I analyze the morally integrated epistemology of the values (Section "2.1") and, elaborating on the second reading offered by Raz, I defend the interpretive dependence of the values (Section "2.2").
| Translated title of the contribution | Values as Object-Dependent Truths and Values as Interpretative-Dependent Truths |
|---|---|
| Original language | Spanish |
| Publisher | SSRN |
| Pages | 1-19 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 14 Oct 2020 |
Keywords
- Joseph Raz
- Ronald Dworkin
- interpretivism
- legal theory
- legal interpretation