Universality of Nash components

D. Balkenborg, A.J. Vermeulen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We show that Nash equilibrium components are universal for the collection of connected polyhedral sets. More precisely for every polyhedral set we construct a so-called binary game-a game where all players have two pure strategies and a common utility function with values either zero or one-whose success set (the set of strategy profiles where the maximal payoff of one is indeed achieved) is homeomorphic to the given polyhedral set. Since compact semi-algebraic sets can be triangulated, a similar result follows for the collection of connected compact semi-algebraic sets.

We discuss implications of our results for the strategic stability of success sets, and use the results to construct a Nash component with index k for any fixed integer k.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)67-76
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume86
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2014

Cite this

Balkenborg, D. ; Vermeulen, A.J. / Universality of Nash components. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2014 ; Vol. 86. pp. 67-76.
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Universality of Nash components. / Balkenborg, D.; Vermeulen, A.J.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 86, 01.01.2014, p. 67-76.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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AU - Vermeulen, A.J.

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