This paper analyzes unifications of nationally defined commercial laws within an elementary non-cooperative game-theoretical framework. In the absence of any coordination, it is far from obvious that nation-states will ever succeed in selecting the very same commercial laws. Yet, as the gains to be reaped by adherence to the same commercial laws may not necessarily be distributed equally among the nation-states involved, coordination may be quite difficult to achieve. In this respect, a nation-state that is better able to spur economic growth than all other nation-states will be able to influence the outcome of any coordination of decisions between nation-states in a profound way. This is because nation-states may voluntarily seek to adopt the legal rules of a nation-state that is strongest able to boost economic growth into a uniform commercial law. Thereby, nation-states may most stimulate their exports to and capital investments from the nation-state that is the strongest engine of economic growth.
|Series||METEOR Research Memorandum|
- c52 - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
- k00 - Law and Economics: General