Unfair Contests

E. Feess, G. Muehlheusser, M. Walzl

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Real-world contests are often "unfair" in the sense that outperforming all rivals may not be enough to be the winner, because some contestants are favored by the allocation rule, while others are handicapped. This paper analyzes an unfair, two-player discriminatory contest (all-pay auction) with private values. We characterize equilibrium strategies, provide closed form solutions, and illustrate additional strategic issues arising in such unfair contests.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)267-291
Number of pages25
JournalJournal of Economics
Volume93
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2008

Cite this

Feess, E., Muehlheusser, G., & Walzl, M. (2008). Unfair Contests. Journal of Economics, 93(3), 267-291. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0308-9