Unfair Contests

E. Feess; G. Muehlheusser; M. Walzl

doi:10.1007/s00712-007-0308-9

Unfair Contests

E. Feess, G. Muehlheusser^*, M. Walzl

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

Real-world contests are often "unfair" in the sense that outperforming all rivals may not be enough to be the winner, because some contestants are favored by the allocation rule, while others are handicapped. This paper analyzes an unfair, two-player discriminatory contest (all-pay auction) with private values. We characterize equilibrium strategies, provide closed form solutions, and illustrate additional strategic issues arising in such unfair contests.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	267-291
Number of pages	25
Journal	Journal of Economics
Volume	93
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0308-9
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2008

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10.1007/s00712-007-0308-9

Cite this

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