Transferable utility games with uncertainty

H. Habis, P.J.J. Herings

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TU-games are convex. 

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2126-2139
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume146
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2011

Keywords

  • Transferable utility games
  • Uncertainty
  • Weak Sequential Core
  • COOPERATIVE GAMES
  • SEQUENTIAL CORE

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