Abstract
Unless all tournaments are admissible as individual preferences, we show
that, structure diversity of the range of a Pareto-optimal, neutral,
non-dictatorial, and independent of irrelevant alternatives preference rules
is greater than the structure diversity in the individual preferences upon
which these preference rules are based.
that, structure diversity of the range of a Pareto-optimal, neutral,
non-dictatorial, and independent of irrelevant alternatives preference rules
is greater than the structure diversity in the individual preferences upon
which these preference rules are based.
Original language | English |
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Publisher | Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics |
Number of pages | 16 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 30 Sept 2021 |
Publication series
Series | GSBE Research Memoranda |
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Number | 015 |
ISSN | 2666-8807 |