Tournaments as collective decisions

Ton Storcken

doi:10.26481/umagsb.2021015

Tournaments as collective decisions

Ton Storcken^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Working paper / Preprint › Working paper

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Abstract

Unless all tournaments are admissible as individual preferences, we show
that, structure diversity of the range of a Pareto-optimal, neutral,
non-dictatorial, and independent of irrelevant alternatives preference rules
is greater than the structure diversity in the individual preferences upon
which these preference rules are based.

Original language	English
Publisher	Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
Number of pages	16
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2021015
Publication status	Published - 30 Sept 2021

Publication series

Series	GSBE Research Memoranda
Number	015
ISSN	2666-8807

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10.26481/umagsb.2021015

RM21015Final published version, 382 KB

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Tournaments as collective decisions

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