Three-level games in EU external migration policy: negotiating mobility partnerships in West Africa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In order to increase the effectiveness of migration management, the EU increasingly enters into agreements with third countries. Such co-operation aims to engage third countries in migration control mechanisms in exchange for enhanced legal migration opportunities, yet this externalization of migration policy is highly selective with regard to both participating Member States and third countries. In this paper we develop a three-level game perspective to explain why Member States and third countries participate in EU external migration policy initiatives. The three-level game links three sets of actors in two strategic interactions: Member States, EU institutions and third countries. We argue that two factors determine the outcome of negotiations: the cost of no agreement and the autonomy of central decision-makers. The model is illustrated by the successful and failed Mobility Partnership negotiations between EU Member States, the European Commission and, respectively, Cape Verde and Senegal.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)857–874
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Common Market Studies
Volume53
Issue number4
Early online date21 Dec 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2015

Keywords

  • 2-LEVEL GAMES
  • CONDITIONALITY
  • COUNTRIES
  • EASTERN-EUROPE
  • EUROPEANIZATION
  • GOVERNANCE
  • POLITICS

Cite this

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title = "Three-level games in EU external migration policy: negotiating mobility partnerships in West Africa",
abstract = "In order to increase the effectiveness of migration management, the EU increasingly enters into agreements with third countries. Such co-operation aims to engage third countries in migration control mechanisms in exchange for enhanced legal migration opportunities, yet this externalization of migration policy is highly selective with regard to both participating Member States and third countries. In this paper we develop a three-level game perspective to explain why Member States and third countries participate in EU external migration policy initiatives. The three-level game links three sets of actors in two strategic interactions: Member States, EU institutions and third countries. We argue that two factors determine the outcome of negotiations: the cost of no agreement and the autonomy of central decision-makers. The model is illustrated by the successful and failed Mobility Partnership negotiations between EU Member States, the European Commission and, respectively, Cape Verde and Senegal.",
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Three-level games in EU external migration policy: negotiating mobility partnerships in West Africa. / Reslow, N.; Vink, M.

In: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 53, No. 4, 07.2015, p. 857–874 .

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Three-level games in EU external migration policy: negotiating mobility partnerships in West Africa

AU - Reslow, N.

AU - Vink, M.

PY - 2015/7

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N2 - In order to increase the effectiveness of migration management, the EU increasingly enters into agreements with third countries. Such co-operation aims to engage third countries in migration control mechanisms in exchange for enhanced legal migration opportunities, yet this externalization of migration policy is highly selective with regard to both participating Member States and third countries. In this paper we develop a three-level game perspective to explain why Member States and third countries participate in EU external migration policy initiatives. The three-level game links three sets of actors in two strategic interactions: Member States, EU institutions and third countries. We argue that two factors determine the outcome of negotiations: the cost of no agreement and the autonomy of central decision-makers. The model is illustrated by the successful and failed Mobility Partnership negotiations between EU Member States, the European Commission and, respectively, Cape Verde and Senegal.

AB - In order to increase the effectiveness of migration management, the EU increasingly enters into agreements with third countries. Such co-operation aims to engage third countries in migration control mechanisms in exchange for enhanced legal migration opportunities, yet this externalization of migration policy is highly selective with regard to both participating Member States and third countries. In this paper we develop a three-level game perspective to explain why Member States and third countries participate in EU external migration policy initiatives. The three-level game links three sets of actors in two strategic interactions: Member States, EU institutions and third countries. We argue that two factors determine the outcome of negotiations: the cost of no agreement and the autonomy of central decision-makers. The model is illustrated by the successful and failed Mobility Partnership negotiations between EU Member States, the European Commission and, respectively, Cape Verde and Senegal.

KW - 2-LEVEL GAMES

KW - CONDITIONALITY

KW - COUNTRIES

KW - EASTERN-EUROPE

KW - EUROPEANIZATION

KW - GOVERNANCE

KW - POLITICS

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