The Uneasy Case for a Ransom Tax

B. Nieuwesteeg; M. Faure

doi:10.1017/err.2022.45

The Uneasy Case for a Ransom Tax

B. Nieuwesteeg^*, M. Faure

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

The goal of our paper is to demonstrate the potential effects of a tax on paying a ransom on the incentives of stakeholders involved: both the perpetrators (the attackers placing the ransomware) as well as the potential victim. We do think that there is a case for a ransom tax, but we do also realise that it is not easy to make that case, and hence we express this doubt in our title. A tax could stimulate ex ante cybersecurity and also (when price elasticity is not too low) reduce ex post ransom payments. In addition, a tax in combination with a smartly designed subsidy could have benefits.

Original language	English
Number of pages	17
Journal	European Journal of Risk Regulation
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2022.45
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 1 Feb 2023

Keywords

cyber insurance
cyber risk
cybersecurity
ransomware
taxation
private
victim

Access to Document

10.1017/err.2022.45Licence: CC BY

Cite this

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