The structure of Pareto equilibria of two-person multicriteria games

P.J.A. Borm, A.J. Vermeulen*, M. voorneveld

*Corresponding author for this work

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In this paper the structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicriteria games is analysed. It turns out that the classical result for the set of equilibria for bimatrix games, that it is a finite union of polytopes, is only valid for multicriteria games if one of the players only has two pure strategies. A full polyhedral description of these polytopes can be derived when the player with an arbitrary number of pure strategies has one criterion.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)480-493
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2003

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