The Rule of the Present, not the Past

Franco Peirone*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

There is a perennial ambiguity in the rule-of-law preposition: it predicates that the law shall rule, but which law? This legal loophole has led to a diverse array of interpretations of the concept. Of these, two appear particularly adverse to what the rule of law should primarily be—the rulership of the law—yet still remain dominant. On the one hand, the rule of law is intended to be the vehicle to deliver above-the-law goods such as human rights or other individual entitlements like property, and to forever shield them against any other force, including the law. On the other hand, the rule of law is believed to be a tool at the rulers’ disposal, who make use of the law but are not bound by it, for either legal or practical reasons. In both cases, a pre-legal setting for society allocates rulership to something but not the law, against the very essence of the ideal: an authoritative legal practice for the sake of regulating the present society. As such, the rule of law has to meet certain requirements of craftsmanship, like conditions in law-making and law-enforcement, and sources, which are to be democratically underpinned.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-28
Number of pages28
JournalJus Cogens
Volume3
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 24 Sept 2021

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