The procedural egalitarian solution

Bas Dietzenbacher; Peter Borm; Ruud Hendrickx

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.001

The procedural egalitarian solution

Bas Dietzenbacher^*, Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx

^*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first single-valued solution which coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games and which exists for any TU-game.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	179-187
Number of pages	9
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	106
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.001
Publication status	Published - Nov 2017
Externally published	Yes

JEL classifications

c71 - Cooperative Games

Keywords

egalitarianism
egalitarian procedure
procedural egalitarian solution
egalitarian stability
constrained equal awards rule

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10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.001

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AB - In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first single-valued solution which coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games and which exists for any TU-game.

KW - egalitarianism

KW - egalitarian procedure

KW - procedural egalitarian solution

KW - egalitarian stability

KW - constrained equal awards rule

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.001

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.001

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JO - Games and Economic Behavior

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ER -

The procedural egalitarian solution

Abstract

JEL classifications

Keywords

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