The procedural egalitarian solution

Bas Dietzenbacher*, Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first single-valued solution which coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games and which exists for any TU-game.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)179-187
Number of pages9
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume106
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2017
Externally publishedYes

JEL classifications

  • c71 - Cooperative Games

Keywords

  • egalitarianism
  • egalitarian procedure
  • procedural egalitarian solution
  • egalitarian stability
  • constrained equal awards rule

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