The potential for criminal enforcement in greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes: Some experience from China

The serious consequences of climate change have attracted scholars to discuss the use of criminal law to protect the climate. The important role of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading schemes (ETSs) in controlling GHG emissions may offer an opportunity to use criminal law to address emissions misconduct, i.e. serious violations of an ETS. This article provides a theoretical framework for interpreting why criminal enforcement is needed to ensure compliance with an ETS, and the extent to which criminal enforcement can play a role in an ETS. To establish the theoretical framework, this article reviews economic literature on public enforcement. It also looks at China's national and pilot ETSs to assess whether and to which extent these ETSs are consistent with the proposed theoretical framework. This article argues that criminal enforcement can and should only play a complementary role in an ETS to ensure adequate deterrent effects of enforcement regimes. This need for, and limited potential of, criminal enforcement can be observed in China's ETSs, particularly in the national ETS and the Shenzhen, Beijing, and Tianjin pilots. Also, this article explores the possibilities of using criminal enforcement to deter regulated entities from violating China's ETSs under China's criminal law system.