Abstract
This paper studies the nucleolus of graph-restricted games as an alternative for the Shapley value to evaluate communication situations. We focus on the inheritance of properties of cooperative games related to the nucleolus: strong compromise admissibility and compromise stability. These two properties allow for a direct, closed formula for the nucleolus. We characterize the families of graphs for which the graph-restricted games inherit these properties from the underlying games. Moreover, for each of these two properties, we characterize the family of graphs for which the nucleolus is invariant
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1117-1135 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Annals of Operations Research |
Volume | 318 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Nov 2022 |
Keywords
- communication situations
- graph-restricted game
- inheritance of properties
- strong compromise admissibility
- compromise stability
- invariance of the nucleolus