The nucleolus and inheritance of properties in communication situations

J. Schouten*, B. Dietzenbacher, P. Borm

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review


This paper studies the nucleolus of graph-restricted games as an alternative for the Shapley value to evaluate communication situations. We focus on the inheritance of properties of cooperative games related to the nucleolus: strong compromise admissibility and compromise stability. These two properties allow for a direct, closed formula for the nucleolus. We characterize the families of graphs for which the graph-restricted games inherit these properties from the underlying games. Moreover, for each of these two properties, we characterize the family of graphs for which the nucleolus is invariant
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1117-1135
Number of pages19
JournalAnnals of Operations Research
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2022


  • communication situations
  • graph-restricted game
  • inheritance of properties
  • strong compromise admissibility
  • compromise stability
  • invariance of the nucleolus

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