TY - JOUR

T1 - The midpoint-constrained egalitarian bargaining solution

AU - Karos, Dominik

AU - Rachmilevitch, Shiran

N1 - data source: no data used

PY - 2019/9

Y1 - 2019/9

N2 - A payoff allocation in a bargaining problem is midpoint dominant if each player obtains at least one nth of her ideal payoff. The egalitarian solution of a bargaining problem may select a payoff configuration which is not midpoint dominant. We propose and characterize the solution which selects for each bargaining problem the feasible allocation that is closest to the egalitarian allocation, subject to being midpoint dominant. Our main axiom, midpoint monotonicity, is new to the literature: it imposes the standard monotonicity requirement whenever doing so does not result in selecting an allocation which is not midpoint dominant. In order to prove our main result we develop a general extension theorem for bargaining solutions that are order-preserving with respect to any order on the set of bargaining problems.

AB - A payoff allocation in a bargaining problem is midpoint dominant if each player obtains at least one nth of her ideal payoff. The egalitarian solution of a bargaining problem may select a payoff configuration which is not midpoint dominant. We propose and characterize the solution which selects for each bargaining problem the feasible allocation that is closest to the egalitarian allocation, subject to being midpoint dominant. Our main axiom, midpoint monotonicity, is new to the literature: it imposes the standard monotonicity requirement whenever doing so does not result in selecting an allocation which is not midpoint dominant. In order to prove our main result we develop a general extension theorem for bargaining solutions that are order-preserving with respect to any order on the set of bargaining problems.

U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.07.006

DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.07.006

M3 - Article

VL - 101

SP - 107

EP - 112

JO - Mathematical Social Sciences

JF - Mathematical Social Sciences

SN - 0165-4896

ER -