The midpoint-constrained egalitarian bargaining solution

Dominik Karos, Shiran Rachmilevitch*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

A payoff allocation in a bargaining problem is midpoint dominant if each player obtains at least one nth of her ideal payoff. The egalitarian solution of a bargaining problem may select a payoff configuration which is not midpoint dominant. We propose and characterize the solution which selects for each bargaining problem the feasible allocation that is closest to the egalitarian allocation, subject to being midpoint dominant. Our main axiom, midpoint monotonicity, is new to the literature: it imposes the standard monotonicity requirement whenever doing so does not result in selecting an allocation which is not midpoint dominant. In order to prove our main result we develop a general extension theorem for bargaining solutions that are order-preserving with respect to any order on the set of bargaining problems.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)107-112
Number of pages6
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume101
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2019

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