The lowest-bid all-pay-auction as a fundraising mechanism: theoretically optimal but behaviorally fragile

D. Damianov, R.J.A.P. Peeters

Research output: Working paperProfessional

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Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationMaastricht
PublisherMETEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics
Number of pages29
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2012

Publication series

SeriesMETEOR Research Memorandum
Number050

Cite this

Damianov, D., & Peeters, R. J. A. P. (2012). The lowest-bid all-pay-auction as a fundraising mechanism: theoretically optimal but behaviorally fragile. METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics. METEOR Research Memorandum, No. 050 https://doi.org/10.26481/umamet.2012050