Abstract
We provide a comparison of bidding behavior between multi-round and single-round auctions considering bid lettings for asphalt construction contracts that are known to have primarily private costs. Using a reduced-form difference-in-difference approach as well as the nonparametric estimation technique that was proposed by Racine and Li (J Econom 119(1):99-130, 2004) we find that bidding is more aggressive in a sequential multi-round setting than in a simultaneous single-round format. We explore potential causes for the bidding difference across formats that are related to synergies and the level of bidder participation.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 321-343 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Journal | Review of Industrial Organization |
Volume | 42 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - May 2013 |
Keywords
- Multi-unit auctions
- Procurement auctions
- SYNERGIES
- ENTRY
- EQUILIBRIUM
- COMPETITION