The Communication Complexity of Private Value Single Item Auctions

E. Grigorieva, P.J.J. Herings, R.J. Müller*, A.J. Vermeulen

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

6 Citations (Web of Science)
84 Downloads (Pure)


This paper is concerned with information revelation in single-item auctions. We compute how much data needs to be transmitted in three strategically equivalent auctions—the vickrey auction, the english auction and the recently proposed bisection auction—and show that in the truth-telling equilibrium the bisection auction is the best performer.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)491-498
Number of pages8
JournalOperations Research Letters
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2006

Cite this