The Communication Complexity of Private Value Single Item Auctions

E. Grigorieva; P.J.J. Herings; R.J. Müller; A.J. Vermeulen

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2005.07.011

The Communication Complexity of Private Value Single Item Auctions

E. Grigorieva, P.J.J. Herings, R.J. Müller^*, A.J. Vermeulen

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

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Abstract

This paper is concerned with information revelation in single-item auctions. We compute how much data needs to be transmitted in three strategically equivalent auctions—the vickrey auction, the english auction and the recently proposed bisection auction—and show that in the truth-telling equilibrium the bisection auction is the best performer.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	491-498
Number of pages	8
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	34
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2005.07.011
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2006

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10.1016/j.orl.2005.07.011

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Cite this

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title = "The Communication Complexity of Private Value Single Item Auctions",

abstract = "This paper is concerned with information revelation in single-item auctions. We compute how much data needs to be transmitted in three strategically equivalent auctions—the vickrey auction, the english auction and the recently proposed bisection auction—and show that in the truth-telling equilibrium the bisection auction is the best performer.",

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AB - This paper is concerned with information revelation in single-item auctions. We compute how much data needs to be transmitted in three strategically equivalent auctions—the vickrey auction, the english auction and the recently proposed bisection auction—and show that in the truth-telling equilibrium the bisection auction is the best performer.

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